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PINK ELEPHANTS IN THE RAPE TRIAL: THE PROBLEM OF
TORT-TYPE DEFENSES IN THE CRIMINAL LAW OF RAPE
AYA GRUBER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like many female civil libertarians, I often feel trapped in the
feminist defense attorney dilemma. On the one hand, I am and
always will be a woman. I have suffered through sexual harass-
ment. I have been the recipient of unfair discrimination. I have
carefully analyzed issues of social role and stereotype. Of course,
I possess strong opinions on the subject of rape. I follow the
feminist scholars. I listen to Susan Estrich:
Conduct is labeled criminal "to announce to society that these
actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them are
done." It is time - long past time - to announce to society our
condemnation of simple rape, and to enforce that condemnation
"to secure that fewer of them are done." The message of the law
to men, and to women, should be made clear. Simple rape is
real rape.'
I know that as a woman, I am to condemn rape as the most
invidious of crimes. I also realize that rape, in particular, is a crime
that cannot be analyzed outside a social context. As the literature
expresses quite vehemently, rape is not as simple as an act done by
one individual to another, whose criminality is determined by a fair
trial. Rape laws and trials implicate extensive historical and social
attitudes that reflect the existing patriarchy:2
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California at Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Alan Dershowitz for patiently
advising the drafting of the article, Professor Duncan Kennedy for his wonderful advice,
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to Keith Kieberthal for hs indispensible help on the drafting and proofing of the article.
1. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 104 (1987) (quoting H. L. A. HART, PUNIsHMENT &
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 6 (1968)).
2. Feminists observe:
Patriarchy, a social system that privileges male over female power in spheres
of endeavor our society values highly, is at the core of most feminist theory.
Feminist theory focuses on the social mechanisms by which male power is
perpetuated, urging ways to break the patriarchal yoke. Consistent with this
view, rape is seen not as the act of an isolated, disturbed individual, but as a
social mechanism for keeping women subordinated. Rape keeps women in their
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[R]ape law reflects the sexually coercive society in which it
operates. Although frowning upon aggressive sexual behavior
at the extremes, our male-dominated society accepts a certain
amount of coercion, aggression or violence against women as a
normal, even desirable, part of sexual encounters.3
place, and fear of rape and other sexualized violence keeps women passive,
sensitive to male needs, fearful of venturing out alone at night in public spaces,
and dependent on the protection and presence of a man. Women therefore alter
their behavior in endless ways, not because it serves their individual needs, but
because it serves their men.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 394-95 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
3. Lani Anne Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent
Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1993).
Two recent cases in the media complicate the theory that rape jurisprudence merely
reflects the existing patriarchy. One case appears to support this theory. Dateline NBC
recently ran a story on a Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Cross, 609 N.E.2d 88 (Mass.
1993), in which thirty-three year old female teacher, Karen Cross, was convicted of the
statutory rape of a 15 year old male student. The case came down to the word of the
complainant against the word of the defendant. The defense attorney revealed that the
complainant could not remember many basic facts, such as what the defendant was wearing
right before the alleged rape. The prosecution introduced a letter the defendant wrote to the
complainant. Although the letter never referenced any sexual encounters, it did at one point
state, "I can't get you off my f-ing mind." The jury deliberated for three days before
returning a guilty verdict. During the interview, they all agreed there was little, if any, hard
evidence of the sexual encounter. One juror stated, "I was very reluctant to find Karen Cross
guilty despite the facts or what - what very few facts there were in essence. There wasn't
very much concrete evidence in my opinion." The jury felt, however, that Cross had acted
"inappropriately" and "unprofessionally." One juror asked, "Would a mature teacher write
that [letter] to a student ' The jury, it seems, applied the same patriarchal rationale applied
in female-victim rape cases. The same juror who said there was not enough evidence later
stated, "I had to finally admit she was guilty because I sensed that she was a lonely and
frustrated woman." Dateline NBC: Teacher's Pet?: Karen Cross, Teacher, Accused of Raping
Student (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 26, 1997). In many female-victim rape cases, the
jury analyzes "inappropriate" behavior as assumption of risk of rape. See infra text
accompanying notes 72-78. In the Cross case, the jury analyzed the defendant's
"inappropriate" behavior as assumption of risk of a rape accusation and subsequent
conviction.
Juxtaposed is the recent Brown college sexual assault case. The facts were relatively
uncontested: Sara was drunk. Adam was drunk. Adam had reason to believe Sara was
drunk. He took her to his room where she initiated sexual intercourse. He did not refuse.
The Brown administration expelled Adam for sexual misconduct but later reduced the
penalty to probation. An interesting phenomenon resulted on Brown's campus. Sara was
hailed a hero for speaking out. No one seemed to condemn her for being "falling down" drunk
at a fraternity party. No one seemed to care that she had engaged in a casual sexual
relationship. No one stigmatized her. This reaction was a far cry from what the literature
indicates the social response to be. Adam, on the other hand, became a campus outcast. He
received threats. He was stigmatized a rapist. D. Morgan McVicar, Gray Area At Brown:
A Night of Drinking and a Chance Encounter at an Ivy League School: Was It a Simple Case
of Bad Judgment or Was It Rape?, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Jan. 3, 1997, at El. This case
raises several interesting issues. Perhaps the patriarchy is not as strong as it once was.
Maybe only student at Brown, an Ivy League school with a large liberal component, would
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In addition, I have read all the statistics: One in five college
students admit to having been "physically forced" to have sexual
intercourse by a date.4 Only sixteen percent of all rapes are ever
reported to the police.5 Finally, I know the extent to which rape
harms the victim. "Rape is one of the most brutal, invasive and
degrading forms of criminal victimization. Researchers have tho-
roughly documented that victims of rape suffer intense trauma, and
profound and lasting injury."6 I know this not just from reading,
but also from personal experience. I am one of the millions of
women that, according to statistics, have experienced such harm.
This combination of knowledge and personal experience informs the
feminist side of my dilemma.
On the other hand, I am an aspiring defense attorney. I am a
civil libertarian who sincerely believes in the rights of the criminal
defendant.7 I think social reforms should not come at the expense
of individual liberty. For example, I believe incriminating evidence
react this way. There seems to be some evidence of this, given the large public outcry
against the Brown administration's initial decision to expel. To many, this case signaled that
rape reform had gone too far. As early as 1992, members of the public have cried out against
"militant" rape reform:
[WIomen's growing militancy on the issue of date rape ... has alarmed many
men. 'The political momentum has swung to the other side of the gender gap"
.... "We live in a time of sexual inquisition." Other men express fears that a
misunderstood gesture or a vengeful woman could land them in court.
Mary Nemeth et al., Chilling the Sexes: Women's Growing Militancy About Harassment and
Date Rape Alarms Many Men, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 17, 1992, at 42, 43 (citation omitted).
4. This was a study conducted at the University of South Dakota and Cornell University
in 1985. ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 12 (citing BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 22, 1985, at 6).
5. See NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER AND CRIME VIcTIMs RESEARCH AND TREATMENT
CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 6 (1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL VICTIM
CENTER].
6. Steven B. Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex" Recognizing Gender-Based
Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 30 (1994). The authors elaborate:
The detrimental effects include any immediate physical injury sustained during
the victimization as well as the risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted
diseases, including HIV/AIDS. In the long term, most rape victims report
various forms of serious emotional harm as well. Victims often experience "rape
trauma syndrome" or some variant of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
which is a chronic psychological disorder characterized by sleeplessness,
hypervigilence, fearfulness and anxiety, and coping difficulties. Other reported
psychological and emotional problems include phobic responses, eating
disorders, denial, shock, guilt, hostility and blame, helplessness and
dependency, hypersensitivity, and general functioning disturbances.
Id. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
7. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 771 n.27 (1986) ("Indeed, within the
ACLU, there was controversy concerning the proper scope of rape-shield legislation - a not
surprising fact considering the ACLU's strong commitment both to women's rights and to the
rights of criminal defendants.").
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should be excluded, even if true and highly relevant, if obtained in
violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Addition-
ally, a criminal defendant should be able to present any evidence
that is probative of his innocence, unless its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value.' Even then, in close
cases, judges should err on the side of admitting exculpatory
evidence.
In the same vein, I believe that the social goals of encouraging
rape reporting and reforming the rape trial process should not
outweigh the individual criminal defendant's rights. For example,
the social goal of encouraging rape reporting should not compromise
the defendant's fair trial guarantees. Many experts indicate that
underreporting is largely caused by the victim's slim chance of
vindication at trial.9 In response, legislatures could make rules
requiring, say, every fourth rape case to result in conviction. Such
laws would obviously increase convictions and probably lead to
more reporting of rapes. One could object, however, to the govern-
ment determining the "correct" rate of reporting a crime and adjust-
ing the outcome of trials to create that reporting rate. In addition,
this legislation obviously would violate the defendant's right to fair
trial and due process. Although it would cause more guilty defend-
ants to be convicted, it would also put more innocent defendants in
jail. It seems obvious that such legislation would not be a fair
method of addressing rape underreporting.
Yet one could argue that this is precisely what many rape
reform laws do. They increase conviction rates in nearly as
arbitrary a way by tinkering with the evidence a criminal defendant
is permitted to present or by shifting legal definitions and burdens.
While such reforms cause higher reporting and conviction rates,
they inevitably cause more innocent people to be reported and
convicted. Such reforms also risk infringing upon other constitu-
tional guarantees.1" These considerations inform the civil libertar-
ian side of my dilemma.
This struggle between women's rights and defendants' rights
has been highlighted in the ongoing debate over rape legislation:
8. This is stock evidentiary analysis under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See infra note 95.
9. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 31-32 (discussing the slim chance of
convicting and incarcerating rapists).
10. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231-33 (1988) (per curiam) (ruling that the
exclusion under Kentucky's rape shield laws of evidence offered to impeach the complainant
violated the defendant's confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution); see also infra text accompanying notes 140-44.
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[R]ape statutes are designed to both protect women and convict
those persons guilty of the crime. To many, these two objectives
seem irreconcilable. Reflected throughout the legislative and
adjudicatory history of rape laws is a fear that the larger goal
of protecting women will be achieved at the price of convicting
some innocent men."
This tension is evident in the current jurisprudential discourse.
First, it arises in the debate over the proper definition of rape:
Force, consent, affirmative nonconsent, or affirmative consent. To
combat some of the problems with the consent inquiry, 2 current
reformers call for a return to a pure force standard. 3 Others
11. Victoria J. Dettmar, Comment, Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating the Defense
of Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as to Victim Consent, 89 DICK. L. REV. 473, 474 (1985)
(footnote omitted).
12. See Cynthia A. Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A
Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1988)
(footnote omitted):
Rape laws, which focus on the victim's nonconsent, inadequately define the
crime and thereby contribute to the criminal justice system's failure to reduce
the occurrence of rape. Compared to other crimes against the person, the
reporting, arrest, and conviction rates for rape are very low. The inadequate
definition of rape contributes to these low rates because the focus on the
victim's conduct discourages reporting, the element of nonconsent is difficult to
prove, and therefore, prosecutors are reluctant to bring cases and juries are
reluctant to convict. The inadequacies of rape law threaten the safety and
independence of women, who are the overwhelming majority of rape victims in
the United States.
13. Initially, United States rape law focused on force and resistance. Complainants had
to make a showing of extreme force by the defendant and utmost resistance on their part.
See Reynolds v. State, 42 N.W. 903, 904 (Neb. 1889) ("voluntary submission by the woman
while she has power to resist, no matter how reluctantly yielded, removes from the act an
essential element of the crime of rape'), overruled by Fulton v. Nebraska, 81 N.W.2d 177
(Neb. 1957). The realization, through social science, that women submit to rape against their
wills even where there is no tangible physical force, led to the incorporation of a consent
standard. Under this standard, the relevant inquiry is whether or not the complainant
consented to the sexual intercourse. See Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224 (Mass.
1982).
Variations of this standard abound, requiring different measures of mens rea. One
variation is the subjective victim intent standard, in which the relevant fact is whether or
not the victim actually consented. Another variation is the subjective defendant intent
standard in which the relevant fact is whether or not the defendant actually believed the
victim consented. Next is the objective defendant intent standard in which the relevant fact
is whether or not a reasonable person would have believed the victim did not consent. Given
the increasing number of fraternity related rapes and date rapes involving alcohol, an
increasingly visible subset of the consent inquiry is whether or not the victim had the
capacity to consent, or whether or not the defendant knew or had reason to know the victim
was not capable of consenting. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Crimes and Punishments § 463(2)
(1957) (proscribing intercourse with a person "[wiho is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should
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advocate an affirmative consent standard, requiring the defendant
to show the complainant said "yes."14 Although tinkering with the
definition of rape seems like a permissible way to increase convic-
tions and reporting, it has many of the same problems as simply
increasing the conviction rate. Affirmative consent standards, for
example, require defendants to show that they received permission
to engage in sexual intercourse. If they cannot, a presumption of
nonconsent arises.'5 While this presumption will put more actual
reasonably know the other person is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless').
It becomes increasingly evident that the consent inquiry was a messy affair. Calling into
question a victim's past behavior, requiring resistance as evidence of past consent, and
analyzing a victim's behavior and appearance as evidence of consent led to calls for a
reformation of the consent standard. See, e.g., Wicktom, supra note 12, at 400-12. As a
result, some reformers advocated a return to the force standard:
By removing the element of the victim's nonconsent and defining rape by the
forceful nature of the offender's conduct, the burden-shifting statute more
closely resembles other laws criminalizing violent acts against the person, such
as robbery and assault. These laws criminalize the forceful taking of property
or the intention to inflict injury without proof of the victim's nonconsent.
Furthermore, assault laws do not allow the victim's consent to be used as a
defense except in exceptional circumstances.
Id. at 425 (footnotes omitted). There are, however, several problems with the force definition
of rape. First, it ignores the social science that leads to the consent standard. In addition,
it decriminalizes criminal activity and criminalizes legitimate activity. On the one hand,
there are cases in which force is not evident but the victim has not consented to sex. A force
standard decriminalizes those incidents. On the other hand, sexual behaviors vary wildly.
Many people do, in fact, consensually incorporate force into their sexual regimen. The harm
caused by rape does not merely result from force. It results from complex psychological
conditions caused by a victim's engagement in sexual intercourse against her will. The mere
presence of force, if consented to, does not cause the harm. The force standards thus
criminalize behavior that is not harmful. Moreover, it makes no sense to conceptualize force
in sexual relations outside an additional consent inquiry. Any form of sex involves a physical
penetration of the body. It is inherently forceful. Consent to this "invasion" makes the
physical penetration not an assault.
14. Reformers go so far as to argue that lack of affirmative consent (neither asking for
nor receiving a "yes') should raise a presumption of nonconsent:
A verbal standard ... accords with the principle of maximum autonomy for
women. A requirement of verbal consent at the time of sexual activity would
result in a near-perfect correlation between legal and actual indications of
consent: there could be no question that the behavior is intended to be an
indication of consent to sexual activity; the intended recipient of the signal
would be clear; and finally, no inference could be drawn from irrelevant consent
to sexual encounters on other occasions. Under such a standard, the only
"behavior" from which a woman would be required to refrain in order to
preserve her right to legal protection of her sexual autonomy would be an
entirely reasonable one - verbal indication of consent at the time of sexual
activity.
Remick, supra note 3, at 1126.
15. Experts explain:
The prosecution's case would consist of proof of: 1) sexual activity, and 2) verbal
nonconsent or absence of verbal consent. Proof of verbal nonconsent would
1997] PINK ELEPHANTS IN THE RAPE TRIAL 209
rapists in jail (men who engage in sex with nonconsenting victims),
it will also put more innocent men in jail (men who engage in sex
with consenting victims). 6 The only difference is that the innocent
man who does not ask permission is defined by the law as a
criminal. Merely defining away the possibility of jailing innocents
will not satisfy the civil libertarian side of the feminist defense
attorney. 1
7
raise an irrebuttable presumption of nonconsent (a "no" means "no" standard).
Proof of the absence of affirmative verbal consent would raise a rebuttable
presumption of nonconsent; the burden of proof would then shift to the
defendant to show through evidence of nonverbal signals that the complainant
had actually consented to the sexual activity in question despite her lack of
verbal consent. Actual consent would have to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt
Id. at 1129. Although successful at eliminating the undesirable aspects of consent inquiry,
this standard has its own set of problems. First, merely shifting the burden of proof of
consent will not necessarily eliminate the inquiry into the complainant's past and present
behavior. Arguably, the defendant has more of an incentive to introduce any kind of proof
of consent that he can, given that he now has to overcome the hurdle of proving his defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also not clear why the defendant would have to prove his
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, as opposed to, say, by a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, this standard criminalizes behavior which, in all fairness, does not deserve
punishment on the level of violent stranger rape. A defendant who does not ask for
affirmative consent is guilty under this standard, even if the complainant initiated sexual
intercourse and, in fact, consented to it.
16. Those in favor of affirmative consent respond as follows:
Imposing a duty to inquire as to consent before participating in potentially
nonconsensual intercourse comports with the distribution of responsibility
characteristic of other criminal offenses, which never excuse the defendant
because of his or her victim's failure to prevent the crime. Why in rape should
the burden be on the potential victim to prevent harm from coming to herself
rather than upon the potential perpetrator to refrain from harming another?
Id. at 1138. While it is true that the woman should not assume the risk of being raped
simply because she has not uttered certain words, a man should not have to assume the risk
of being convicted of rape when the sex was, in fact, consensual just because he forgot to ask
permission. This standard creates a crime in which not only is there no mens rea or actus
reus, there is also no harm to the complainant. Even in other crimes where mens rea and
actus reus are not required, see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding conviction
of defendants for first degree murder even where there was no specific intent and the
defendants were not the trigger-men), there is usually, at least, some tangible harm to the
victim. The apparent unfairness of the affirmative consent standard may, in the end, invite
the jury to nullify when it is clear the defendant did not ask permission, but there is little
evidence of nonconsent.
17. In response to these problems with the definition of rape, Professor Alan Dershowitz
has suggested staircasing rape offenses. The most penalized offense would be, for example,
violent stranger rape and the lowest, negligent non-asking. The problem with this way of
defining rape is that it does not address the problems affirmative consent standards seek to
avoid. District Attorneys will charge defendants with the highest penalized rape as possible.
Defendants will then defend against such charges by putting in evidence of consent,
including embarrassing evidence of the past and present behavior of the complainant.
Professor Alan Dershowitz, Seminar in Criminal Law at Harvard Law School (Feb. 1995).
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Another way of reforming the rape trial process is by starting
from the ground up and changing social attitudes about women and
rape.18 Obviously, changing social attitudes in no way affects the
rights of the accused. It is, however, a long row to hoe. Instituting
a massive campaign of sexual reeducation is difficult in this time of
limited funds, mass media, and popular sexual culture. Moreover,
many feel that the government should not be in the business of
telling its citizens what to think and what not to think. Finally,
such a solution may be merely supplemental to solving legal
problems within the rape trial itself.
The tension between feminism and fair trial is also present in
the rape shield debate. As argued above, it is illegitimate to
sacrifice an essentially fair trial in order to solve the social problem
of underreporting. Reforms targeted at correcting flaws internal to
the rape trial process, however, would actually further a fair trial
and comply with constitutional requirements:
If the evidence sought to be excluded by a rape-shield statute is
irrelevant, or if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by prejudice, the sixth amendment does not mandate its
admissibility. It is beyond dispute that a criminal defendant
has no constitutional right to present irrelevant, prejudicial
evidence in his or her behalf.19
In this vein, rape shield advocates contend that shield laws address
both social problems outside of the trial and legal evidentiary
problems within the trial.2 ° The problem with rape shield laws,
18. Experts observe:
Societal ascription of stereotypical male and female sexual roles informs both
men's and women's understanding of sexual communication. "Little boys pick
up the message that they are supposed to be powerful, not act like a 'sissy,' and
compete at all times .... ." When these boys become men, they may feel
pressured to "conquer a woman sexually" and "not submit to any of her
requests." Because their understanding of sexual interaction is informed by
these assumptions, "[m]en ... frequently misinterpret the intent of various
dating behaviors and erotic play engaged in by their opposite-sexed partners."
Remick, supra note 3, at 1144-45 (citing Ann Norton, Talking Back to Sexual Pressure,
WHOLE EARTH REV., Summer 1992, at 111; Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8
LAW & PHIL. 217, 221 (1989)).
19. Galvin, supra note 7, at 806.
20. Experts observe:
Proof of sexual conduct was treated as a species of "character" evidence, a form
of circumstantial evidence offered at trial in order to prove that a person
possessing a particular character trait acted in conformity with that trait on the
occasion in question.... This inferential use of character ... is sharply circum-
scribed by a set of rules and exceptions once described as a "grotesque
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however, is that they, at once, do too much and too little."' They do
too much in that they do not merely ensure the proper admission of
evidence, but arguably exclude permissible evidence for social policy
reasons. In this sense, they are like the above example of convict-
ing every fourth rape defendant. They do too little in that they
allow in certain evidence of victim behavior that may have an
impermissible effect on the jury (i.e. contributory behavior from
which the jury will infer that "she asked for it"). This impermissi-
ble effect on the jury of evidence of contributory behavior is one of
the most unjust aspects of the criminal rape trial and is the subject
of this paper.
This paper hopes to temper the feminist defense attorney
dilemma. It identifies the foremost legal error in the rape trial as
the "widespread bootlegging of the tort concepts of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk into the working law of
rape."22 The importation of tort-type defenses into the criminal
rape trial is a legal flaw within the trial process that calls for a
legal solution. Eradicating such defenses is not an attempt to
address external social problems surrounding rape~by tinkering
with the trial process. Rather, it addresses a legal problem within
the rape trial itself. When acquittals occur based on such victim
precipitation defenses, they occur impermissibly. Thus, any
increases in convictions arising from reforms that narrowly target
this trial problem are justified increases.
Part II of the paper will describe the extent to which the tort
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk have
been incorporated into the law of rape. It will explore the perva-
siveness of victim precipitation considerations in social attitudes,
statutory law, common law, attorneys' attitudes, judges' attitudes,
and jury deliberations. Part III analyzes rape shield reform. First,
it surveys the structure of, and polices behind, rape shield laws. It
then exposes how rape shield laws, at once, do too much and too
little. It shows that rape shield reforms have been utilized at the
structure" which is "archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and
compensations."
Id. at 777 (citing Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (footnotes omitted)).
21. This will be explored in further detail in Part III. See infra notes 137-61 and
accompanying text.
22. Terri Villa-McDowell, Privacy and the Rape Victim: The Inconsistent Treatment of
Privacy Interests in Two Recent Supreme Court Cases, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
293, 327 (1992). The author continues, "It]he study of rape is an especially illustrative
example of how victimology can become the art of blaming the victim ... .' Juries and judges
react extremely harshly to the complainant whenever she seems in any way to have brought
the attack upon herself." Id. at 328 (citations omitted). Tort-type defenses are also known
as "victim precipitation" defenses. See Winters, infra note 31.
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expense of defendants' constitutional rights and highlights the
failure of rape shield laws to address the bootlegging of tort
defenses into the rape trial. Part IV explains why the importation
of tort defenses into the criminal law of rape is improper. Finally,
Part V proposes reforms aimed at eliminating this problem.
II. THE PERVASIVENESS OF TORT DEFENSE IN RAPE LAW
The importation of tort defenses into the criminal rape trial is
a problematic and pervasive aspect of modern rape law:
One of the most repugnant characteristics of contemporary rape
cases where the rapist is a person known to the victim... is an
unspoken standard, enforced by legal arguments and believed
by juries, of something like "contributory negligence" as
negating the rapist's culpability.23
This legal problem is distinct from evidence problems targeted by
rape shield laws.24 The evidence problems targeted by shield laws
mainly involve the jury "improperly" inferring either consent or
propensity to lie from past behavior or unchaste character.25 The
problem of tort defenses involves implying consent from certain
actions on the part of the victim.26 The actual consent of the victim
is immaterial to this type of a defense. If a woman "asked for it" by
dressing or acting a certain way, whether or not she ultimately con-
sented, becomes irrelevant to whether the rape is justified.
Evidence of victim precipitation varies. It may include evidence of
past sexual behavior of the victim (unchastity),"7 social behavior of
the victim with regard to the defendant (going on a date or drinking
with the defendant),28 dress of the victim, 29 status of the victim
23. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American "Retreat Rule," 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 303, 330 n.161 (1992).
24. The problem is one of jury nullification rather than impermissible inferences. See
infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of these evidence problems.
25. See, e.g., Remick, supra note 3, at 1121 (identifying "the problem of unjust inferences
from a woman's actions or inaction").
26. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1729 (1995) (describing assumption of risk and contributory
negligence principles as "plaintiffs strict responsibility" justified by "consensual rationale').
27. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
29. Underwear OK'd as Evidence in Smith Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 1991, at 2
(discussing the belief that "someone who buys their underwear at Victoria's Secret cannot
be a victim of a sexual battery).
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(prostitute or married to the defendant),3" socially undesirable
behavior of the victim (hitchhiking),31 and even race of the victim.32
The legal problem of importing tort defenses has its roots in
community attitudes. Ann Landers, purveyor of "proper" social
attitude, has stated, "the woman who 'repairs to some private place
for a few drinks and a little shared affection' has, by her acceptance
of such a cozy invitation, given the man reason to believe she is a
candidate for whatever he might have in mind."33 Society ingrains
these attitudes in children as they grow up. A 1979 study of
fourteen- to seventeen-year-old Caucasians living in Los Angeles
revealed that the teenagers often incorporated victim precipitation
into their opinions on rape. They felt that women with a "loose"
reputation were far less likely to be viewed as legitimate victims
than women who engaged in sexual activity short of coitus. Fifty-
four percent of the respondents said that aggressive sex was jus-
tified if the woman 'led him on." Fifty-one percent said it was
justified when the woman "got him excited."34 Midwestern college
men identified a different set of victim contributory behavior as jus-
tifying sexual intercourse. Being a "known teaser" ranked highest
at justifying unconsensual intercourse, and "economic exploitation"
came second. Being "more or less a regular date" ranked lowest at
justifying sexual intercourse.35
Much of society's attitude toward victim precipitation is based
on "rape myths," which embody the idea that women are to blame
for rape:
30. See Jane Gross, To Some Rape Victims, Justice Is Beyond Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1990, at A14 (noting that the criminal justice system disregards rape allegations made by
prostitutes); see also infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the marital
exemption).
31. See Kathleen Winters, United States v. Shaw: What Constitutes an "Injury" Under
the Federal Rape Shield Statute, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 952 n.31 (1989) ("Victim
Precipitation'... is applied to cases in which the victim either puts herself in a vulnerable
situation (hitchhiking, going to a man's apartment) or retracts from an earlier agreement to
have sex.").
32. See GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 219-20 (1989) (observing that jurors are less likely to believe black women
who complain of rape).
33. John D. Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for "No" to Really Mean "No," 21 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 3, 33 (1993) (quoting Ann Landers, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1985, at 9).
34. LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 67 (1989) (citing R. Giarusso et al.,
Adolescents' Cues and Signals: Sex and Assault, Paper Presented at the Western
Psychological Association Meeting in San Diego, California (Apr. 1979)).
35. See id. at 66-68 (citing E. J. Kanin, Date Rapists: Differential Sexual Socialization
and Relative Deprivation, 14 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 219-35 (1985)).
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[R]ape myths are familiar to us all - women mean "yes" when
they say "no"; women are "asking for it" when they wear
provocative clothes, go to bars alone, or simply walk down the
street at night; only virgins can be raped; women are vengeful,
bitter creatures "out to get men"; if a woman says "yes" once,
there is no reason to believe her "no" the next time; women who
"tease" men deserve to be raped; the majority of women who are
raped are promiscuous or have bad reputations; a woman who
goes to the home of a man on the first date implies she is willing
to have sex; women cry rape to cover up an illegitimate preg-
nancy; a man is justified in forcing sex on a woman who makes
him sexually excited; a man is entitled to sex if he buys a
woman dinner; women derive pleasure from victimization. 6
Rape myths can pervade all aspects of the rape trial from the
prosecutor's decision to try the case37 to jury deliberations. 38
Scholars and social scientists have legitimized these myths by in-
cluding them in their analyses of rape. Social scientist Menachem
Amir undertook a comprehensive study of psychological and socio-
logical factors contributing to forcible rape. After studying victim
precipitation, he concluded, in part, that "if penal justice is to be
fair it must be attentive to these problems of degrees of victim re-
sponsibility for her. own victimization."39 Such a belief that criminal
law should incorporate rather than exclude rape myths is also
manifest in scholarly work like Wigmore's treatise on Evidence:
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant
young girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of
cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted
partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or
abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by
36. Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial
in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1014-15 (1991).
37. See BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 100 (observing that prosecutors, in particular, did
not feel it was rape when couples "had been drinking or had previously engaged in
consensual sex").
38. See Euphemia B. Warren, She's Gotta Have It Now: A Qualified Rape Counselor-
Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 189 n.12 (1995) (observing that "perhaps the most
frightening aspect of these 'rape myths' is the effect they can have on a jury deciding a rape
case."). See also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204 (1986) ("Since the
jury reflects the attitudes and biases of the community, jurors deciding rape cases will
represent the anger, ambivalence, and myths that characterize public views of rape.
Inevitably, these attitudes affect their perspectives and ultimately their decisions in cases
of rape.").
39. MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 276 (1971).
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temporary physiological or emotional conditions .... The real
victim, however, too often.., is the innocent man .... 40
Historically, rape statutes have included these tort-type
defenses in a variety of ways. For many years states enforced a
"marital exemption" to the law of rape.41 The marital exemption
was a tort-type defense premised on the theory that a woman's
decision to marry implied consent to all sexual relations with her
husband.42 Under this exemption, the assumption of risk of rape
could not be retracted by a married woman.43  Catherine Mac-
Kinnon has characterized the marital exemption as the theory that
marriage creates an irrebuttable presumption of consent.4' As the
feminist movement gained momentum, courts and legislatures
began to reconsider the marital exemption. In the 1984 case of
People v. Liberta,45 Judge Wachtler struck the marital exemption
from the New York Penal Law:
[A] marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body as does an
unmarried woman. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in
the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or
forceful, self-help."46
Not only did Judge Wachtler condemn the marital exemption in
particular, he also criticized all assumption of risk arguments in the
rape context, observing that "[rape] is a degrading, violent act
which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently
40. 1 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736 (Chadbourn Revision 1970). Wigmore also
observed that "[t]he unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression
in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is... straightforward and
convincing." Id.
41. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (1980) (defining "female" for the purpose of rape
law as "any female person who is not married to the actor").
42. See People v. Meli, 193 N.Y.S. 365, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (justifying the marital
exemption "on account of the matrimonial consent which [the wife] has given, and which she
cannot retract").
43. See id.
44. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 648-49 (1983).
45. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 392 (Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 5th ed. 1989)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES].
46. Id. at 393 (quoting State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 206 (1981)).
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causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm. To ever
imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. 47
With the rise of views like Judge Wachtler's, states began to
change the marital exemption. First, states made the exemption
inapplicable to couples who were divorced or no longer cohabiting.48
Second, states tempered the exemption, making it more of a
rebuttable presumption of consent. The Model Penal Code observes
that "marriage or equivalent relationship, while not amounting to
a legal waiver of the woman's right to say 'no,' does imply a kind of
generalized consent that distinguishes some versions of the crime
of rape from parallel behavior by the husband. 49  This mere
tempering is certainly a far cry from the elimination of the marital
exemption that Judge Wachtler had in mind. In addition, a number
of state rape statutes continue to incorporate a "voluntary social
companion exception '"5 that reduces the degree of felony for rape,
much like the way provocation reduces first degree murder to
manslaughter.5
Courts formalistically incorporated assumption of risk princi-
ples in rape law by specifying certain complainant behavior as
elements of the crime. For example, courts required the complain-
ant to demonstrate that she "resisted to the utmost."52 Many have
analyzed the resistance requirement as part of the consent
determination. In this sense, lack of resistance constitutes prima
facie evidence of consent. The fact that resistance was an absolute
requirement, however, indicates that it embodied more of an
assumption of risk analysis. Courts required complainants to show
47. Id.
48. Alabama, Illinois, and South Dakota still allow the exemption even when the couple
is separated by formal court order. Only a divorce can remove the exemption. See CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra note 45, at 398.
49. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 344 (1980). The
commentary continues:
At a minimum, therefore, husbands must be exempt from those categories of
liability based not on force or coercion but on a presumed incapacity of the
woman to consent.... The major context of which those who would abandon
the spousal exclusion are thinking, however, is the situation of rape by force or
threat. The problem with abandoning the immunity in many such situations
is that the law of rape, if applied to spouses, would thrust the prospect of
criminal sanctions into the ongoing process of adjustment in the marital
relationship.
Id. at cmt. 8(c), at 344-45.
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 773-775 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 252-253 (West 1983).
51. See infra note 170 for a discussion of the provocation defense.
52. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 268 N.E.2d 865, 868 (111. 1971) (holding that the victim
must "show such resistance as will demonstrate that the act was against her will").
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resistance even in cases where resistance would have placed them
in danger.53 Basically, a woman assumed the risk of a rape by
failing to resist. Although most jurisdictions have replaced
"resistance to the utmost" with "reasonable resistance,"54 vestiges
of the requirement continue to influence common law in many
jurisdictions.
Courts have also incorporated tort principles into the common
law of rape in less formalistic ways. Although they explicitly reject
assumption of risk and contributory negligence as technical
defenses to rape,55 courts incorporate these principles in less
explicit ways. For example, they make it part of the assessment of
victim credibility. In Gordon v. State, the Court of Appeals of
Alabama observed, "We are of the opinion, but slight, if any,
credence could be accorded to the testimony of the unfortunate
perverted woman involved. Not only because of her abnormal
conduct as disclosed by the undisputed testimony . .. ""
The abnormal behavior consisted of drinking and asking the
defendant to have a drink with her.5 Courts have also engaged in
tort-type analysis by specifically noting victim precipitation
53. See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 516 P.2d 592, 593-94 (Wyo. 1973) (reversing conviction
where victim had an actual fear of the defendant on the grounds that "it would place the
determination solely in the judgment of the prosecutrix and omit the necessary element of
a reasonable apprehension and a reasonable ground for such fear; and the reasonableness
must rest with the fact finder").
54. See People v. Hayne, 341 N.E.2d 182, 189 (Ill. App. 1976) (ruling that defendant was
not entitled to instruction that if the victim yielded reluctantly while still having power to
resist, she consented).
55. See, e.g., State v. Overman, 153 S.E.2d 44, 58 (N.C. 1967) (holding that "[clontri-
butory negligence by the victim is no bar to prosecution by the State for the crime of rape").
Specifically, the court observed, "the fact that a woman goes, without proper escort, to a place
where men of low morals might reasonably be expected to congregate does not establish her
consent to have sexual relations with them." Id. Even then, the court was quick to point out
that such evidence "is competent evidence to be considered by the jury on that question." Id.
In Keeton v. State,, the court firmly ruled that contributory negligence was not a defense to
rape. The court opined:
Even if [the complainant] had gone to the cabin on this occasion with appellant
with the express purpose and intention of engaging with him in sexual
relationship, and even though she had remained for that purpose after the
other couple had left the cabin, still she had a right to change her mind and to
refuse to carry out such intention or any promise relative thereto.
Keeton v. State, 190 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1945). See also Bradley v. State, 333
S.E.2d 578 (Ga. 1985) (upholding conviction for rape of co-worker); People v. Quicke, 390 P.2d
393 (Cal. 1964) (affirming conviction when victim voluntarily went to drive-in movie with
defendant).
56. 26 So. 2d 419, 422 (Ala. App. 1946).
57. Id. at 421-22.
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behavior, such as meeting at a bar, 8 entering the defendant's car,59
or inviting the defendant for a drink.' The high profile Mike Tyson
and William Kennedy Smith rape trials extensively involved the
complainants' contributory behavior like dress, drinking, and going
to the defendants' private residences.6 Some scholars even suggest
that assumption of risk-type principles may have been involved in
the Supreme Court's decision in The Florida Star v. B.J.F.6 2 to
strike down a rape victim privacy statute.
6 3
Attitudes about victim precipitation also pervade the pre-trial
stage of rape cases. Contributory behavior by the victim influences
the decision of the police to investigate charges of rape. A 1985
national study of over two thousand police officers revealed that
officers are "insensitive to rape victims and were suspicious of
victims who had previous and willing sex with the assailant or who
'provoked' rape through their appearance or behavior."64 Prosecu-
tors also rely on assumption of risk principles in their decisions to
prosecute rape cases. 5 Surprisingly, these principles often slip,
.perhaps subconsciously, into their arguments during trial. One
prosecutor argued in closing: '"ou wouldn't let a burglar go free
because the door was not locked. Don't let a rapist go free because
58. See People v. Greer, 374 N.Y.S.2d 224 (App. Div. 1975).
59. See Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 322 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
60. See Valez v. State, 762 P.2d 1267 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
61. See Ingram, supra note 33, at 33, "I do not recognize any acceptable basis for placing
any weight or relevance on a woman's appearance or demeanor. At the time of the William
Kennedy Smith trial there was a great deal of discussion about the complainant's underwear
allegedly being 'suggestive'...."
62. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
63. Villa-McDowell, supra note 22, at 328 (footnotes omitted). She states:
Such reckless behavior as walking at night, crossing a park at a certain hour,
or talking to a strange man, may be enough to turn a victim into a co-
conspirator in the eyes of the judge. This may well have been operating in
B.J.F. In the record, the news item reporting her rape noted that she was
"crossing Brentwood Park" at an undisclosed time, enroute to her bus stop.
Id.
64. BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 46-47 (citing John C. LeDoux & Robert R. Hazelwood,
Police Attitudes and Beliefs Toward Rape, 13 J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 211 (1985)); see also
Carol S. Goldstein, The Dilemma of the Rape Victim: A Descriptive Analysis, 7 CRIM. JUST.
MONOGRAPH 1, 15 (1976) (describing how police officers differentiate between rape victims):
The psychologist... ask[ed] what [the police officers] thought the punishment
should be for rape. The... answer... was castration or death .... The [police
officers] ... were thinking of their own wives, mothers, sisters and daughters
[as victims]. The psychologist asked [the police officers] to discuss rape cases
they handled .... [T]he officers discussed the mode of dress and the 'low moral
character' of the victims with whom they had come in contact .... [T]he women
they had dealt with could hardly complain about rape since... they were not
virgins ....
65. See BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 100.
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[a woman] is too dumb not to make herself an easy mark."6" The
defendants in this case were acquitted of all charges.6 It is no
secret that defense attorneys incorporate assumption of risk
arguments into their cases. Mike Tyson's lawyer argued that
because it was widely known that Tyson had a propensity for
violence, "to date him was to consent to sex."
68
Once inside the trial, judges, and especially juries, rely upon
tort defenses.69 The idea that the negligent victim "asked for it" can
affect many judicial decisions, from the admission of evidence to
jury instructions.70 It is the jury, however, whose invocation of tort
principles most undermines justice in the criminal rape trial. This
invocation of tort principles is similar to jury nullification.
Although the material fact to be decided is whether or not there was
consent, the jury sets aside this inquiry and instead decides
whether or not the complainant is "responsible" for or "deserves"
the ensuing rape:
In 1989, a circuit court jury in Florida acquitted [a] 26-year-old
[defendant] of abducting a 22-year-old woman at knife point
and repeatedly raping her. The jury based its finding partly on
the fact that she was wearing a lace miniskirt without under-
wear. In explaining the decision of the three-man, three-woman
jury, foreman Roy Diamond said: "We felt she asked for it for
the way she was dressed. 71
66. LAFREE, supra note 32, at 175 (quoting prosecutor in an actual rape case).
67. See id. at 176.
68. Remick, supra note 3, at 1127 n.95 (citing Tyson Takes the Count, NATION, Mar. 2,
1992, at 253).
69. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 31 (quoting DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER 248 (1989)):
Unlike virtually every other crime victim, rape victims face a type of
institutional skepticism. Victims are often the ones put on trial in rape cases,
with juries focusing on extraneous factors like the victim's clothing, lifestyle
and demeanor. Studies of jury behavior and attitudes reveal poorly disguised
hostility toward rape victims whom juries view as assuming the risk of rape "by
conduct such as drinking, wearing 'seductive' clothing, or accepting a ride with
the assailant."
70. See Villa-McDowell, supra note 22, at 329 n.220:
A 1974 study of judges reports that jurists are far less impartial than supposed.
The judges interviewed were of three viewpoints about rape victims' credibility.
The first was the genuine victim, the woman attacked in a dark alley by a
stranger. She was credible. The second was the woman who had met a man in
a bar and allowed him to drive her home. The third was the woman victim who
was vindictive, who was crying rape because of male rejection or slights. This
last category of female had absolutely no credibility.
71. Remick, supra note 3, at 1123 (citing Mary Nemeth et al., Chilling the Sexes:
Women's Growing Militancy About Harassment and Date Rape Alarms Many Men,
MACLEAN'S, Feb. 17, 1992, at 42, 43).
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When juries incorporate rape myths in their deliberations,"
they are deciding cases based not on the law of rape but rather on
society's laws about the "proper" role of women. In their well-
known study of American Juries, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel
observed the pervasiveness of victim precipitation considerations in
jury deliberations."3 They discovered that focus on the victim's
contributory behavior as grounds for acquittal was the biggest
source of jury-judge disagreement. They observed:
The law recognizes only one issue in rape cases other than the
fact of intercourse: whether there was consent at the moment
of intercourse. The jury, as we come to see it, does not limit
itself to this one issue; it goes on to weigh the woman's conduct
in the prior history of the affair. It closely, and often harshly,
scrutinizes the female complainant and is moved to be lenient
with the defendant whenever there are suggestions of contribu-
tory behavior on her part. 4
Interestingly, the authors noted that jury deliberations focused
more on victim contributory behavior than victim spite or vindic-
tiveness.75 The study identified situations in which the jury
absolutely favored acquittal, for example, when defendant and
complainant were divorced but continued to spend time together.
In this case, the jury "was of the opinion that if [sex] was in a
course of conduct which she had accepted, she was in no position to
complain... "76 In three other identified cases, juries favored first
lessening the charge, but if that was not possible, acquitting rather
than convicting. The fact scenarios were as follows: (1) complain-
ant had been drinking and alleged rape by several men; (2)
defendant met complainant at a nightclub and later drove her to a
deserted road and raped her; (3) defendant met complainant at a
nightclub and later drove her to a' wooded area and raped her.7
Juries also preferred acquittal in cases where the complainant had
engaged in intercourse with the defendant on prior occasions. In a
particularly disturbing case, a jury acquitted three men who had
kidnapped a woman at 1:30 a.m. and raped her in an extremely
brutal manner. "It developed that the young unmarried girl had
72. See Warren, supra note 38.
73. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 248-57 (1966).
74. Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
75. See id. at 249 n.10.
76. Id. at 250.
77. Id. at 250-51.
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two illegitimate children; also defendant claimed she was a
prostitute. 78  No other evidence of prostitution, however, was
introduced. Even the judge characterized the verdict as "a travesty
of justice."7 9 This case emphasizes that the importation of tort
defenses into rape law is a deeply-rooted and pervasive problem
which has remained largely untouched by current rape reforms.
III. RAPE SHIELD REFORM: STRUCTURES, PURPOSES,
INADEQUACIES
A. Structure of Shield Laws
Rape shield laws basically prohibit introducing into evidence
the complainant's prior sexual conduct. Statutes range from highly
restrictive to more lenient. The Michigan rape shield statute, for
example, absolutely prohibits the introduction of prior sexual
conduct in any form, with specific enumerated exceptions.8 0 All
Michigan-type statutes permit introduction of evidence of sexual
conduct between the complainant and the accused." The reason is
the "high probative value and minimal prejudicial effect of this
evidence.... Rather than relying on the invidious inference that
consent with one implies consent with others, this evidence is
probative of the complainant's state of mind toward the particular
defendant." 2
Another exception is evidence of specific instances of sexual
conduct tending to prove an alternative source of the physical
78. Id. at 251.
79. Id.
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1997). It provides in pertinent part:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion
evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct shall not be admitted... unless and only to the extent that the
judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in
the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
81. See id. § 750.520j(2), providing in pertinent part:
If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b),
the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file
a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing
to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1)
82. Galvin, supra note 7, at 815.
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consequences of the alleged rape.83 This evidence is, of course,
highly probative, but only in cases where the defendant denies
engaging in the sexual intercourse. Some statutes allow evidence
of sexual conduct tending to prove the complainant's motive to
fabricate the charge.84 The reasoning behind this exception is
simple: "however compelling the state interest in protecting the
privacy of the complainant, it is unlikely that such an interest could
be relied upon to block impeachment of her credibility by means of
evidence as probative as that of bias or motive to fabricate the
charge.""5 Some statutes allow evidence of a pattern of sexual
conduct similar to the charged sexual conduct to prove consent8 6
Although this seems an impermissible admission of bad acts
evidence to prove conformity therewith,87 proponents argue that
such evidence is more analogous to admissible "habit" evidence.88
The rationale behind the exception is as follows:
[W]hat if the accused were offering to show that the victim
habitually goes to bars on Saturday nights, picks up strangers
and takes them home to bed with her, and that over the past
twelve months she has done so on more than twenty occasions?
Now could one assert with assurance that this particular sexual
record does not substantially reinforce the defendant's version
of the night's events? And if it does, should he not be permitted
as a matter of constitutional right to place this evidence before
the jury?8 9
A few of the statutes allow evidence of sexual conduct offered to
prove a mistaken belief in consent.9" Of course, this evidence is only
relevant in jurisdictions that allow mistake of fact as to consent as
83. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (1986) (stating that evidence is admissible
to show conduct of the victim is "the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or condition
of the victim"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1997) (stating that evidence is admissible
to "prove that the defendant was not the source of semen, pregnancy, injury, or disease").
84. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210(2)(b)(A) (1996) (allowing evidence that "[rielates to the
motive or bias of the alleged victim').
85. Galvin, supra note 7, at 826.
86. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3)(a)(I) (West 1997) (allowing evidence tending "to
establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar
to the case at issue").
87. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith....').
88. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 832.
89. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1977) (footnote omitted).
90. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2.3(b) (1997) (permitting evidence that "supports an
inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the complaining witness
consented to the conduct complained of in the prosecution").
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a defense to rape. Many of the statutes allow the defendant to
introduce the complainant's prior sexual conduct to rebut the
prosecution's offer of proof. When the prosecution has "opened the
door" by offering evidence that, for example, the complainant is a
virgin, the defense can come back with evidence of that complain-
ant's prior sexual conduct.91 Finally, many of the statutes allow the
defense to present evidence of the complainant's prior false
allegations of rape.92 Although exceptions abound in Michigan-style
statutes, these exceptions are meant to be exhaustive. The statutes
provide that courts may hold in camera hearings to determine if
evidence fits an exception. Judges are, however, not permitted to
determine admissibility of evidence on a case-by-case basis.93
At the other end of the spectrum are statutes, like Idaho's rape
shield law, which are procedural rather than substantive.94 They
contain no absolute prohibition against admitting the complainant's
prior sexual conduct. Instead, they lay out detailed procedures for
the determination of admissibility.9" Once the judge has heard the
proffered evidence pursuant to statutory procedures, she makes her
determination based on the traditional probative value versus
prejudicial effect analysis.96 Thus, these statutes address social
issues such as privacy more than particularized legal problems such
as the improper admission of evidence. "Proponents of this
approach contended that the in camera admissibility determination
would strike the proper balance between the complainant's privacy
interest and the accused's right to confront his accuser."97
91. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 854.
92. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(3)(C) (1996) (allowing "[elvidence of specific
instances of the complaining witness' past false allegations").
93. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 872.
94. See IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1977) providing in pertinent part:
In prosecutions for the crime of rape, evidence of the prosecuting witness'
previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor reference made thereto in the
presence of the jury, except as provided hereinafter. The defendant may make
application to the court before or during the trial for the admission of evidence
concerning the previous sexual conduct of the prosecuting witness. Upon such
application the court shall conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury as
to the relevancy of such evidence of previous sexual conduct and shall limit the
questioning and control the admission and exclusion of evidence upon trial.
Nothing in this section shall limit the right of either the state or the accused to
impeach credibility by the showing of prior felony convictions.
95. Idaho simply mandates a hearing "out of the presence of the jury." Id. Other states
require in camera hearings. See e.g., TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. § 412(c) (West 1997).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
97. Galvin, supra note 7, at 878.
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Two other approaches lie somewhere between the Michigan ap-
proach and the Idaho approach. California's rape shield statute, for
example, makes all prior sexual conduct offered to prove consent
inadmissible, unless it is evidence of past sexual conduct with the
defendant.98 Past sexual conduct evidence offered to attack the
com-plainant's credibility or to rebut the prosecution's evidence also
is admissible,99 subject to an in camera offer of proof. California
courts were, however, among the first to determine that unchastity
was not an inherently impeaching trait.100 Thus, the statute has
been interpreted to let in only particularized impeaching evidence
of past sexual conduct, not generalized evidence of unchaste char-
acter.101
The second intermediate approach is the federal rape shield
statute.102 This federal evidentiary rule absolutely prohibits intro-
duction of the complainant's past sexual conduct when it is in the
form of opinion or reputation evidence. 13 Other forms of evidence
of past sexual behavior must be presented at an in camera
hearing.'0 4 If the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
prejudicial effect, the evidence is admissible in two specific
98. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c) (West 1996) provides in pertinent part:
(1) [E]vidence of specific instances of the complaining witness' sexual conduct,
or any of that evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove
consent by the complaining witness.
99. See id. § 1103(c)(3), (4).
100. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 895.
101. See id. at 894.
102. See FED. R. EVID. 412, providing in pertinent part:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case...
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with
respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct...
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant.
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing
in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard ....
103. See id. at 412(a).
104. See id. at 412(c)(2).
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situations. The first is when the evidence is of sexual conduct
between the complainant and the defendant. 105 The second is when
the evidence is probative of whether or not the defendant caused
the physical consequences of the rape."° Finally, the rule provides
a catch-all provision, under which any evidence of past sexual
behavior is admissible if the court determines that the exclusion of
the evidence would violate the constitutional rights of the defen-
dant.10 7 Critics state that the catch-all provision is "[a]t best...
unnecessary, and at worst it is unclear. First, no explicit statutory
language is needed to compel trial judges to admit evidence that is
'constitutionally required to be admitted.' Even in the absence of
such a provision, rape-shield legislation could not take precedence
over the Constitution."'08
B. Purposes Behind Rape Shield Laws
Rape shield reforms targeted both social and legal problems.
Reformers observed:
For many women, [the] trial before the jury is often the most
traumatic and horrifying episode of the rape experience. The
victim must face the rapist and a room full of strangers and
provide another graphic description of the rape. She must also
answer many irrelevant and personally humiliating questions
about her past sexual experience and her relationship to the
defendant. The defense will try to prove the victim invited the
rape or that she was so loose or promiscuous that she never
would have resisted the man's advances. 10 9
Shield laws were aimed to correct the social problems contributing
to gross underreporting, underprosecution, and low conviction
rates. They also sought to address evidentiary errors within the
trial. I will examine these two goals in turn.
First, the shield laws responded to social and institutional
skepticism to rape claims, 10 most notably the extreme under-
105. See id. at 412(b)(1)(B).
106. See id. at 412(b)(1)(A).
107. See id. at 412(b)(1)(C).
108. Galvin, supra note 7, at 886 (quoting STEPHEN SALTZBURG & KENNETH REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 224 (1982)).
109. Goldstein, supra note 64, at 19.
110. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 26. "[Women feel] trauma resulting from
availing themselves of an often unsupportive, uncaring or unsympathetic legal system. The
victim faces the uphill battle of an intense personal examination in court and the ill effects
of having personal status characteristics magnified by publicity."
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reporting of the crime."' According to experts, "[f]orty-four percent
of women in the United States have been or will be victims of rape
or attempted rape at least once in their lives.""'  Studies have
revealed that as few as sixteen percent of all rapes are ever
reported."3 Others have estimated the reporting rate to be as low
as ten percent. 114 Researchers have discovered a variety of reasons
for the lack of reporting. One study of women who did not report
rapes revealed that: twenty-nine percent thought it was a "private
or personal matter," twenty-four percent thought "nothing could be
done," sixteen percent were "afraid of reprisal," and nine percent
thought the "police would not want to be bothered.""' 5 Thus, the
most notable factors contributing to underreporting were lack of
response by police and prosecutors, little chance of success at trial,
and embarrassment.
Prosecutors and police added to the trauma suffered by rape
victims. Susan Estrich has observed that "[w]ithout question, rape
victims, particularly in the nonstranger context, initially confront
substantial skepticism from police and prosecutors."' 16 Women
faced ill treatment by other institutional actors. According to
Professor MacKinnon:
Women also feel fear and despair of police, hospitals, and the
legal system. Women believe that not only will we not be
believed by the police, not only will the doctors treat us in
degrading ways, but when we go to court, the incident will not
be seen from our point of view. It is unfortunate that these
fears have, on the whole, proved accurate. The fear of being
111. See SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 16 (1979) ("[Rlape is probably the most underreported
crime"); Carrie J. Scarmeas, Note, Rape Victim - Rape Crisis Counselor Communications:
A New Testimonial Privilege, 86 DICK. L. REV. 539, 542 n.27 (1982) (The FBI notes that rape
is one of the most under-reported crimes in the United States.").
112. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1301 (1991).
113. See NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, supra note 5.
114. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 764 n.2 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement
of Rep. Holtzman)).
115. BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 45 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U. S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE BULLETIN I: THE CRIME OF RAPE (1985)). Other reasons included: "Reported to
someone else" (12%); "didn't think it was important" (7%); "didn't want to get involved" (6%);
"didn't want to take the time" (2%); and other (36%). Id.
116. ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 21; see also Warren, supra note 38, at 143 n.10 ("It is
because women are not believed when they cry rape that the rate of underreporting is so
high.").
PINK ELEPHANTS IN THE RAPE TRIAL
treated poorly is not an invention of women's imaginations. It
is the result of the way we have been treated. 117
Women were further discouraged from reporting and prosecuting
rapes by the realization that, in addition to the institutional mis-
treatment, they had an extremely slim shot at a conviction.
Chances of success at trial were often very low. Studies revealed:
The rights of rape victims are rarely vindicated, in either the
criminal or civil courts. Most estimate that only two to five
percent of all rapists are ever convicted, and only about one
percent of women succeed in bringing civil actions against their
rapists. Moreover, Department of Justice statistics reveal that
[thirteen percent] of convicted rapists are never sentenced to
serve any time in prison or jail. For those sentenced to prison
terms, the median time served before release is [forty-seven]
months." 8
Finally, even if they could succeed at trial, women were reluctant
to face the embarrassment of reporting and prosecuting the rape."9
They faced not only the court, defendant and jury, but also the
community and possibly the media. Given the taboo nature of the
subject of sex in our society, even if a victim vindicated her rights
through a conviction, she still would have to endure the embarrass-
ment of public knowledge of her sexual encounter. These social
considerations underlay rape shield reform.
Rape shield laws have also targeted a variety of perceived
evidentiary errors within the rape trial. First, the laws aimed at
correcting the problem of admitting evidence whose low probative
value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. s° Rape reformers
contended that jurors were making logical "mistakes" by inferring
consent to the disputed sexual intercourse at issue from past
instances of sexual conduct. They asserted, "There may be slight
117. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 82 (1987); see also Taslitz, supra
note 2, at 391 ("The behavior of police, prosecutors, mental health personnel, families, and
friends toward victims departing from the ideal also may discourage the woman from
enduring prosecution.").
118. Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 31-32 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 188 (1992)).
119. See KATZ & MAZUR, supra note 111, at 203 (footnotes omitted) ("For some rape
victims, the process of reporting the crime may be more traumatic than the rape itself. The
victim is often acutely embarrassed and ashamed. She is further traumatized by the
procedures of the law enforcement investigation and the hospital medical examination.").
120. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 767 ('[A] growing body of feminist literature questioned
the traditional rationale that a woman's unchastity has probative value on the question of
whether or not she was raped.").
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or no correlation between actual consent and behavior from which
a jury deduces consent. In fact, studies corroborate that '[s]uch
deductive strategies [in determining consent to sexual activity] are
bound to produce frequent errors'."' 2 '
Reformers described the problem as one of the jury making
"unjust inferences."'22 They contended that "[o]nce the notion of a
character flaw is removed from the inferential process, the mere
fact that the complainant has previously engaged in consensual
sexual activity affords no basis for inferring consent on a later
occasion."'23 Others argued that such evidence has no probative
value because it leads to inconsistent conclusions. 1 4 On the one
hand, someone who has consented to sex in the past may be more
likely to have consented to the sex at issue. On the other hand,
such evidence shows that the complainant does not cry rape every
time she has sex. 2 ' Reformers concluded that even if such evidence
had some probative value, it was often far outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. 2 '
Rape shield advocates also identified the error that judges were
admitting past sexual conduct as character evidence to show
conformity therewith. Admission of character evidence for that
purpose is generally proscribed by evidentiary norms.' 7 Although
generally inadmissible, character evidence about complainants in
criminal cases may be admitted for limited purposes. First,
character evidence about the victim's propensity for violence is
admissible in murder cases where the defendant claims she acted
in self-defense.'28 Judges applied a similar exception in rape cases
in which the defendant claimed consent resulting in the routine
121. Remick, supra note 3, at 1125-26 (quoting Antonia Abbey, Misperception as an
Antecedent of Acquaintance Rape: A Consequence of Ambiguity in Communication Between
Women and Men, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 96, 97 (Andrea Parrot &
Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991)).
122. See id. at 1121.
123. Galvin, supra note 7, at 799.
124. See Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 277-78 (1995):
If the victim frequently consented to casual sex, that fact tends to show,
however slightly, that she is more likely to have consented to casual sex on a
particular occasion than another woman who never consents. It also tends,
however, to show that she does not readily make accusations of rape.
125. See id.
126. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
127. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith . . .
128. See id. at 404(a)(2) (providing an exception for "fe]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused).
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admission of character evidence showing the victim's propensity to
be unchaste. Soon the exception began to swallow up the rule.'29
The idiosyncratic way in which character evidence was allowed
to be used becomes even clearer when one considers that similar
sexual information about men was never used to establish
character and that a woman's sexual history could not be used
as evidence of her character in any other kind of case....'30
One important difference between the self-defense exception and
the rape exception is that many courts required independent
evidence that the victim was the aggressor before admitting
character for violence. They did not, however, require independent
evidence of consent before admitting unchaste character evidence.'
3
'
Second, character evidence is admissible to show a witness' pro-
pensity to lie.12 Generally, character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness is admitted as part of this inquiry. In the rape trial context,
however, courts routinely admitted character for unchastity to
prove propensity to lie. Recall Dean Wigmore's admonition that
courts be aware of complainants' "diseased derangements or
abnormal instincts.' 33 Chastity was admissible for credibility pur-
poses not so much as a specific instance of untruthfulness or even
for motive to lie, but more for the reason that an unchaste woman
was tarnished in all respects, including her ability to be truthful.'34
Rape reformers rallied against such archaic thinking, pointing out
that "the purported link between promiscuity and veracity was not
made with regard to male witnesses in those states, nor was it
made with respect to female witnesses in other than sexual offense
prosecutions."'13
5
Finally, rape shield laws aimed to correct the evidentiary
problem of admission of sexual conduct which amounts to the
admission of bad act evidence. 36 Of course, even the evidentiary
129. See BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 104 ("Over the years, sexual history became the only
evidence used to establish the character of the victim in a rape trial.").
130. Id. at 104-05.
131. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 784.
132. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) ('The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported
by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness .. .
133. Wigmore, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
134. See State v. Coella, 28 P. 28, 29 (Wash. 1891) (describing chastity as "that quality
upon which most other good qualities are dependent, and for which, above all others, a
woman is reverenced and respected .....
135. Galvin, supra note 7, at 787.
136. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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prohibition against prior bad acts does not prevent admission of
such evidence when used to show "motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." '137 One might say that prior sexual conduct evidence is
admissible under the modus operandi exception. It would be
unreasonable, however, to conclude that when one has had
consensual sex in the past she has a "modus operandi" of having
consensual sex in general. This may not be so clear where the
complainant has had a pattern of engaging in sex in a certain
manner and then accusing her partner of rape.
C. Inadequacies of Rape Shield Reform
Although rape shield reform has done much to "humanize" the
rape trial process, it often has come at the expense of a defendant's
constitutional rights. Rape shield reform has also inadequately
addressed the foremost legal problem plaguing the rape trial - the
illegal importation of tort defenses. At once, rape shield laws do too
much and too little. 3 ' Addressing the former problem first, rape
shield laws' broad enactments create constitutional and evidentiary
problems resulting in unfairness to the defendant:
The basic problem with existing rape-shield legislation is its
failure to distinguish between benign and invidious uses of
sexual conduct evidence. This failure stems from a misper-
ception by the drafters of the precise wrong to be redressed by
reform legislation. The result is not merely bad evidence law;
in many instances, the result is constitutional problems that
stem from unnecessarily broad enactments.'39
Rape shield laws were meant to combat both social and legal
problems. To the extent that shield laws merely address social
problems, they do not justify any infringement upon the rights of
137. Id.
138. See Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from
the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 914, 988-89 (1994) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he text of the rape shield rule... "raises a number of issues." First is the
flat ban on reputation and opinion evidence. Since the drafters must have
known that a rule cannot overcome the Constitution, they must have been
unable to imagine a situation in which the Constitution would require those
specific forms of proof, according to the editors .... Second, what is the scope
of "past sexual behavior": "Does it encompass nude dancing? Dressing in a
,sexy' manner? Verbal solicitation of sex?" Third, does the rule exclude too
much, creating too many constitutional issues?
139. Galvin, supra note 7, at 812.
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the accused at all. The criminal trial is not the place to wage war
against social prejudice and institutional insensitivity. This is not
to say that if a new evidentiary rule were both fair and addressed
social problems, it should not be implemented. Rather, courts and
legislatures should not be weighing social goals against the rights
of the accused. It is again like the example where the legislature
mandates every fourth rape trial to result in conviction. This would
undoubtedly address the social problem of underreporting. It
would, however, also impermissibly violate every fourth defendant's
constitutional rights. In the same way, rape shield laws may serve
to exclude truly irrelevant and prejudicial evidence three out of four
times or even every thirty-nine out of forty times. But because rape
shield laws are, for the most part, per se exclusions, that fortieth
defendant is denied his right to present relevant evidence. 4 °
While I appreciate the magnitude of the social and institutional
problems surrounding the rape trial, these problems must be given
social and institutional solutions. Society must be informed about
gender equality. Women must fight the urge to say "no" when they
mean "yes." Men must fight the urge to believe that women mean
"yes" when they say "no" or say nothing at all. Police, prosecutors,
and hospital workers must receive training on treating rape victims
sensitively. People must learn not to stigmatize rape victims. The
answer, however, is not to secure rape convictions by any means
possible.
One could draw an analogy to the social problem that the
wealthy receive better representation than the poor. A way to
address this perceived inequality is to make a different standard of
proof for wealthy defendants. One could make the state prove its
case against a wealthy defendant by, say, clear and convincing
evidence only. This would probably balance out the benefit the
wealthy get from their more skilled attorneys. Again, no one would
agree this is the correct solution to that social problem. The
problem of inequality of wealth generally should be solved through
140. See Park, supra note 124, at 278 (footnote omitted):
While I think that the rape shield evidence is distinguishable, I do not mean to
say that victim history can never be worthwhile evidence. There are some
situations in which I would admit it even though it does not fall into any of the
narrow categories specifically set forth in Rule 412. Suppose that a rape
prosecution arises from sexual intercourse that occurred on the pavement of a
parking lot on a cold rainy night. The jury is likely to think that the
complainant would not have consented because of the circumstances. Evidence
that she had consensual intercourse with another man on the same pavement
earlier in the evening, however, leads to inferences that help the defense more
than the prosecution, even if she did not claim rape on the earlier occasion.
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welfare economics. Within the particular context of criminal law,
the problem can be addressed by encouraging skilled attorneys to
become public defenders.
The Supreme Court recognized the danger of rape shield laws
in Olden v. Kentucky. 141 In this case, the defense hoped to present
evidence of the complainant's cohabitation with a man who was not
the defendant to show motive to fabricate the rape. This evidence
was also impeaching because the complainant had stated that she
lived with her mother. Pursuant to Kentucky's rape shield law, the
trial court excluded the evidence of cohabitation.'42 The Supreme
Court ruled that this exclusion of evidence violated the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.14  Rape shield advocates
responded that excluding irrelevant, prejudicial, and character
evidence ensures rather than destroys a fair trial. They reasoned
that no constitutional problem exists with keeping out evidence that
should not be admitted in the first place. 144 Proponents of shield
laws emphasize that past sexual activity is generally irrelevant to
consent. 145
I disagree with the blanket contention that past sexual
behavior is irrelevant to present consent. Even rape shield
proponents admit that such evidence is highly probative in certain
circumstances. 46 I would go even further and say that where the
probative value of the sexual conduct evidence is not as high, a
blanket exclusion cannot be justified on the grounds that the jury
will make "unjust inferences.' 1 47 This is a problematic reading of
the evidentiary rules regarding relevancy and prejudice. Evidence
141. 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
142. Id. at 230.
143. Id. at 231-32.
144. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
145. Lani Anne Remick gives several reasons why the consent inquiry is flawed:
The question the factfinder in a rape trial purports to answer is this: did the
complainant consent to a particular sexual activity, with a particular man, on
a particular occasion? As even a cursory examination will show, the above
laundry list of behaviors includes many that provide scant, if any, assistance in
answering this question.... Each of these behaviors is related to sexual activity
with one specific man, yet any man who introduced such information in court
might receive the benefit of jury misperception of such behaviors as indicia of
consent.... [B]ehaviors which are meant to indicate consent to sexual activity
on one particular occasion may not be meant to indicate consent on another.
Remick, supra note 3, at 1125.
146. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 811-12 (footnotes omitted) ("[E]vidence of the
complainant's previous sexual conduct with someone other than the accused may be relevant
to show her motive for fabricating the charge or to specifically rebut elements of her
testimony.').
147. Remick, supra note 3, at 1121.
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is relevant if it has any effect on the probabilities in a trial.14 8 The
jury, as the ultimate fact-finder, gives probative weight to the
evidence. Evidence is excludable, however, if it will unduly
prejudice the jury. While some differences over the meaning of
"prejudicial" exist, prejudicial evidence basically means evidence
that prevents the jury from fairly deciding the case. Either the
evidence invokes too much emotion, 4 ' leads the jury to make
"inferential errors,'' 50 or causes the jury to do something illegal.'5 '
Rape shield advocates justify rape shield laws on the grounds
that they eliminate "inferential error" prejudice. They seek to
prevent the jury from making "unjust inferences" from evidence of
past sexual conduct.'52 The identified inferential problems gener-
ally involve the jury giving too much weight to past behavior as
probative of consent. A host of problems surround this type of evi-
dentiary analysis. A major problem is that this analysis assumes
its conclusion. The claim that juries are giving the "wrong" weight
to any piece of evidence assumes some external measure of what
the "right" weight is. The jury, however, has the role of determin-
ing the weight of facts in a trial:
[W]e can see the problems of asking... whether and can the
jury get it right. The only way we can answer that question is
by seeing whether the criteria in the trial have been followed:
to use any other criteria would be judging it by reference to
another truth-certifying procedure. This is why jury verdicts
148. See FED. R. EVID. 401 ('Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
149. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ("The case law recognizes that
certain circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance.
These circumstances entail... inducing decision on a purely emotional basis.. .. ").
150. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 506 (1983):
Application of Rule 403 should be focused on a more subtle, common and
dangerous problem: the introduction of evidence that has a tendency to lead
the jury to unintentionally commit an inferential error. Inferential error occurs
when the jury incorrectly decides that evidence is probative of an alleged fact
or event.
151. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ('Unfair prejudice' within its context
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis ..... ). I am suggesting
that the rule means to exclude evidence that leads the jury to decide on a legally, not socially,
improper basis. This has been termed "nullification prejudice." See Roger C. Park,
Character Evidence Issues in the O.J. Simpson Case, 67 U. COLO. L. Rev. 747, 770 (1996)
('Nullification prejudice occurs where the trier draws factually accurate inferences from the
evidentiary facts, but uses them to make a decision on grounds not permitted by the
substantive law.").
152. Remick, supra note 3, at 1121.
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are so difficult to overturn except if the jury perversely does not
decide according to the evidence. It is not a question of whether
the jury, in some absolute way, get it right but whether they
fulfill their allotted role in the system. 53
Proponent's of rape shield laws also advocate the exclusion of
past sexual conduct evidence on the grounds that such evidence
creates two opposing inferences. It is problematic, however, to
argue that evidence which leads to different inferences is a priori
irrelevant or prejudicial. For example, if a defendant is on trial for
murder by means of an explosive, the prosecution may try to
present evidence that the defendant had spent his life studying
plastic explosives. That evidence certainly seems relevant. The
defense may point out, however, that this particular crime not did
not involve a plastic explosive and therefore the evidence actually
made it less likely that the defendant committed the crime.
Certainly, two different inferences can be drawn from such
evidence. It does not make the evidence irrelevant. The jury will
hear the evidence and arguments and decide what weight to give
the evidence and which inferences to draw from it. Now, there may
come a point when drawing out the competing inferences of such
evidence becomes a waste of the court's time. At that point, and not
before, the evidence is excludable under rule 403's prohibition
against evidence that waste's the court's time.'54
Some observe that the concern over judicial economy is really
at the heart of "inferential error" prejudice. Rule 403 does not
prevent the jury from getting it "wrong" so much as it prevents the
jury from getting an incomplete picture. Due to time constraints,
the jury is not presented with all the evidence in a case. Inevitably,
there will be certain pieces of evidence whose inferential meanings
depend on the admission of ancillary evidence. If such ancillary
evidence has not been or cannot be admitted, the judge should
exclude the correlating evidence as prejudicial.'55 This does not,
153. Zenon Bankowski, The Value of Truth: Fact Scepticism Revisited, 1 LEGAL STUD. 257,
266 (1981).
154. See FED. R. EVID 403 (excluding evidence that wastes the court's time).
155. Craig R. Callen, Simpson, Fuhrman, Grice, and Character Evidence, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 777, 783 (1996) (footnote omitted):
The sort of inferential error we should worry about is not one that arises from
a snobbish perception that jurors cannot evaluate evidence such as Fuhrman's
approval of officers who lie for their partners. Instead, the real dangers relate
to the handicaps that the trial process places on jurors. Jurors cannot acquire
additional information without help from the court and, in all likelihood, from
the parties. This dependency creates the implication that the court would
provide them with all necessary information. The jurors might take admission
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however, appear to be the analysis of prejudice employed by rape
shield reforms. The laws make no reference to ancillary evidence.
They do not refer to the type or amount of evidence that could be
proffered in conjunction with sexual conduct evidence to present a
complete picture to the jury. Rather, the laws articulate per se
exclusions of past sexual conduct.
Another problem with inferential error analysis is that juries
may be in a better position than judges, legislatures, and feminist
reformers to determine the weight of any particular piece of
evidence. The American legal system is an adversarial system in
which the jury receives as much evidence as possible and ultimately
decides which inferences to make. Juries have the force of commu-
nity experience on their side. Ideally, juries encompass the
background knowledge of the people within the jurisdiction. They
embody a cross-section of inferential dispositions. This is an
important reason why they are given the role of factfinder:
In general, juries should have the authority to decide questions
of fact in criminal cases. Group fact-finding by a body relatively
untainted by self-interest is likely to be more accurate, under
the peculiar conditions of a criminal trial, than fact-finding by
a single judge .... [I]t is generally a mistake to ask judges to
screen evidence solely to prevent factual mistakes by juries,
because that process would ask the weaker fact-finder to guide
the stronger one.156
Moreover, judges do not have the benefit of their own rulings on the
prejudicial effect of other pieces of evidence. Before making their
determinations regarding the "correct" inferences from a given piece
of evidence, judges are exposed to character evidence, prejudicial
evidence, and the other legally impermissible pieces of evidence.
Additionally, judges may be influenced by more biases than juries.
"Judges are more susceptible to political pressure, fears of losing an
election, corruption, and ties to repeat players in the system."'57
Feminist reformers and legislatures are perhaps in even worse
positions to determine the "correctness" of evidentiary inferences.
Not only are they influenced by political agendas for which they
have selectively picked and analyzed information, reformers and
of the evidence as an implicit assurance of relevance, or to put it another way,
the jurors might understand the admission of the evidence about Fuhrman's
attitude to imply a significant possibility that Fuhrman planted evidence -
without such a possibility the evidence would not be worth the trouble.
156. Park, supra note 151, at 770 (footnote omitted).
157. Id.
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legislatures also have no connection to any particular rape trial.
Rape shield reforms:
legislatively predetermine the relevancy of an entire category of
evidence without regard to the factual setting of the case or the
purpose for which the evidence is offered. Relevancy, after all,
"is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but
exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a
matter properly provable in the case." Not until the issues are
framed in an adversarial setting can a court determine the
relevancy of a specific piece of evidence. The same may be said
of the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. 5 '
Proponents of rape shield laws miss the mark. The prejudicial
effect of evidence in rape trials is not that juries will analyze the
evidence "wrong," or give the "incorrect" amount of weight to the
evidence. The problem is that some evidence leads the jury to
nullify. It is not so much that the jury is thinking that because a
certain complainant has a loose reputation, had sex in the past, or
wears provocative clothing, she therefore consented to the inter-
course at issue. Rather, the jury is saying, "despite the lack of
consent and the 'technical' rape law, we think she placed herself in
a position where she deserved what she got." This is exactly the
kind of "prejudice" that lawmakers should prevent:
There is no mystery or contradiction in postulating that the jury
has primacy in fact-finding while at the same time allowing
judges to exclude evidence in order to prevent or discourage jury
nullification of substantive law. It makes sense that legislators
would seek to prevent nullification and that judges, as represen-
tatives of the legal establishment, would be the gatekeepers.' 59
It is also true that what seems like an "inferential error" may
really be a jury's veiled attempt at nullification. Kalven and Zeisel
discovered that jurors are often at odds with the law. Instead of
admitting nullification, they resolve the facts in a manner to avoid
following a law with which they do not agree:
158. Galvin, supra note 7, at 872-73 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note);
see also Park, supra note 151, at 769 ('Rules designed to prevent [inferential error prejudice]
are vulnerable to the classic Benthamite critique that it is difficult to make judgments
beforehand about the probative value of evidence because so much depends on the
circumstances of the individual case.').
159. Park, supra note 151, at 771.
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[T]he jury does not often consciously and explicitly yield to
sentiment in the teeth of the law. Rathbr it yields to sentiment
in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence. The
jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law within
the etiquette of resolving issues of fact."®
Thus juries might be finding "consent," when what they really mean
is that they felt the complainant "asked for it."
Rape shield laws fall short by failing to take into account the
multitude of victim precipitation evidence that is not past sexual
conduct. They allow in non-sexual conduct evidence like behavior,
clothing, interaction with the defendant, drinking, etc., which can
lead the jury to conclude that the victim asked for it. 6 ' In this
sense, rape shield laws do too little. Preventing the particular
brand of jury nullification that results from the illegal importation
of tort defenses is within the provinces of judges and legislatures.
Policing the jury as to which inferences are permissible and which
are "unjust" is not.
This is not to say that all of the evidentiary reasoning behind
rape shield reform is wrong. Certainly, it is correct that not all past
sexual conduct evidence is relevant. It is also correct that sexual
conduct evidence, even if relevant, can be confusing to the jury,
cumulative, and unduly prejudicial. Similarly, it is right that
character for chastity should not be admitted under the exception
for admitting evidence that relates to truthfulness or untruthful-
ness. The problem is that the rules do too much by excluding
relevant evidence, not because it leads the jury to act illegally, but
because the jury "unjustly" may make different inferences than
feminists would make. Again, the rules do too little by letting in
unrestricted evidence that tends to make the jury act illegally.
They allow all kinds of evidence of victim contributory behavior that
160. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 73, at 165. See also Remick, supra note 3, at 1126-27
(footnotes omitted):
[F]actfinders' ability to consider an overbroad range of female behaviors in
support of the consent defenses means that women must restrict their behavior
lest failure to do so should leave them victims of unpunishable rapes. In this
respect, current rape law comes unconscionably close to giving legal effect to
victim precipitation theories, which posit that certain behaviors of women
provoke or lead to rape.... [J]uries' application of the consent defenses is often
indistinguishable from application of the victim precipitation theory.
161. See Park, supra note 124, at 275-76:
Even with the protection of rape shield laws, victims of rape must endure an
unusual second ordeal when the accused presents a consent defense.... The
defense will also try to show that the victim provoked the sexual event. It may
try to portray her behavior just before the rape as brazen, or her clothing and
manner as provocative.
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is not past sexual conduct. While some think that rape shield
statutes were created to address nullification prejudice,'62 the laws
clearly fail to do so.
IV. THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF TORT DEFENSES IN RAPE LAW
So far this paper has assumed that the importation of tort
defenses into the criminal rape trial is impermissible.'63 The
criminal law explicitly rejects contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk as defenses to criminal rape. 164 As articulated in Part
I, however, such tort defenses pervade all aspects of the rape trial.
Thus, many have the initial instinct to incorporate tort defenses
into their assessment of rape law. They consider it fair to acquit a
defendant because of the victim's contributory behavior. This
section hopes to offer a reasoned response to those who feel that the
"she asked for it" analysis belongs in the criminal rape trial.
Contributory negligence and assumption of risk defenses are
deeply rooted,'65 though strongly debated, doctrines in American
162. See Callen, supra note 155, at 785 (footnotes omitted).
One example of a rule designed, at least in part, to avoid misinterpretation of
substantive standards is Federal Rule 412, the rape-shield rule. Although
earlier rape-shield laws were justified on relevance and undue prejudice
grounds, it is doubtful that juries nowadays would think that prior incidents of
nonmarital intercourse are significantly probative on the issue of consent.
Rather, the evidence is excluded to avoid misinterpretation of underlying law.
The admission of evidence that may seem to have no other bearing might well
imply to the jury that the victim had foregone some legal protection by
consenting to nonmarital intercourse with others.
163. I am careful to say criminal rape trial because this is not always true of civil trials
stemming from rapes. In McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991), the court
explicitly applied the assumption of risk principle to an inmate's civil action against a prison
arising from a rape by another inmate. In denying the plaintiffs claim, Judge Easterbrook
observed:
McGill [the plaintiftl left his cell, saw Ausley heading his way making threats,
and made the decision to take a shower anyway. McGill could have stayed in
his cell or arranged for individual shower and recreation periods - and as we
have emphasized, he could have alerted the guards he passed on the way ....
McGill's decision to accept the risk precludes blaming the guards and higher-
ups in the prison system.
Id. at 353. The court, however, limited it's ruling specifically to the facts of the case, noting
that "[r]ape is an intentional tort, and defenses such as contributory negligence, assumption
of risk, and incurred risk do not apply to intentional torts." Id. at 352.
164. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
165. Contributory negligence and assumption of risk are victim centered defenses in tort
law. They focus either on the victim's contribution to the injury or the victim's voluntary
exposure to the risk. The doctrine of contributory negligence developed in English law and
came to the United States in the 19th century. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep.
926 (1809). "One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care
for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the
PINK ELEPHANTS IN THE RAPE TRIAL
tort law." To understand why such principles do not belong in the
criminal law of rape, one need only highlight some of the differences
between tort law and criminal law. First, tort law is private law. 167
The private plaintiff sues on behalf of himself (or a class like
himself) to recover for a private wrong caused by the defendant. In
a criminal case, the state or people of a jurisdiction bring action
against the defendant for his criminally deviant behavior. This
difference has very important ramifications. First, moral parity'68
is an issue present in tort law but not in criminal law. Because the
plaintiff is attempting to recover from the defendant for the
defendant's breach of a socially-determined standard of care, it is
relevant whether the plaintiff's behavior comported with that
standard of care. If the plaintiffs own negligence lead to the injury,
the plaintiff has no right to recover.'69
Criminal law does not address moral parity. In criminal law,
the issue is not whether one individual has the right to recover from
another.170 The issue is the defendant's criminally deviant behav-
ior. That behavior is deviant whether the victim contributed to it
or not. The victim's negligent acts or knowing exposure to risk do
fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff."
Id. at 927. Assumption of risk also has been a long standing part of American tort law. See
Buenos Aires West India Oil Co. v. Compania Transatlantica de Barcelona, 5 F.2d 425, 432
(2d Cir. 1924) ("The want of a competent lookout properly stationed and vigilant is a fault in
a vessel as a result of which she assumes the consequential risk of a collision."). For the
purposes of this section, no substantive distinction between the two principles will be made.
This section contends that the criminal law should not entertain victim centered defenses
in any form.
166. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975) ("The doctrine of
comparative negligence is preferable to the 'all-or-nothing' doctrine of contributory
negligence from the point of view of logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice..
. ."). Indeed, assigning liability to plaintiff behavior in any form has been questioned. See
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 282 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 5th ed. 1990) ('[There has been
an extensive debate over whether any defense based upon plaintiffs misconduct is needed.").
167. Contributory negligence and assumption of risk defenses do not apply universally in
tort law. They only apply when the underlying tort is unintentional. See McGill, 944 F.2d
at 353. Victim centered defenses are also rejected in other contexts. See Seay v. Chrysler
Corp., 609 P.2d 1382 (Wash. 1980) (rejecting comparative negligence in strict product liability
case); Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85 (1977) (refusing to apply comparative negligence to
wrongful death action).
168. This term refers to the extent to which the injurer acted within a standard of
reasonable care versus the extent to which the injuree acted within a standard of reasonable
care. See Simons, supra note 26, at 1722.
169. Under comparative negligence principles, it is not fair if the plaintiff fully recovers.
170. See Simons, supra note 26, at 1708 ("[The victim's] deficiency is only relevant in
private law if the victim does bring a lawsuit, for a simple reason: the victim's moral duty
does not otherwise affect any other private individual's interest to a sufficient degree to
warrant legal intervention.").
1997] 239
240 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:203
not relieve the state of its duty to punish deviant behavior.' The
victim's deviant behavior can be punished separately. For example,
when two people get in a fight, both have broken the criminal law
proscribing assault and battery. One defendant's criminal act does
not negate the other's. Rather, the two people become cross-
complainants, and the state prosecutes each one. The state has no
interest in the private balance of harm between the two individuals.
The state only has an interest in the defendants' criminal behavior
vis-a-vis society.
Another manifestation of the difference between tort law and
criminal law is that causation is often an issue in tort law but
rarely in criminal law. Contributory negligence is relevant in tort
law because the plaintiff claims that the defendant caused her
171. One notable exception, however, is the law of provocation. The existence of
provocation by a murder victim mitigates the punishment for murder. See Maher v. People,
10 Mich. 212, 218-19 (1862):
But if the act of killing, though intentional, be committed under the influence
of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable
provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and
reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary
excitement, by which the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any
wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition; then the law, out
of indulgence to the frailty of human nature, or rather, in recognition of the
laws upon which human nature is constituted, very properly regards the offense
as of a less heinous character than murder, and gives it the designation of
manslaughter.
This does take into account the contributory behavior of the victim, but not in a tort-type
way. The defense is not centered around moral parity, or the "unfairness" of vindicating the
victim when he, himself, is morally culpable. Rather, the defense is more like self-defense
or temporary insanity. It mitigates the crime because it makes the defendant's behavior
more understandable and less deviant. The defense is more a mens rea issue than a
contributory fault issue. Whether or not the law should excuse those who act on the basis
of passion, however, is a debatable issue. See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion
in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33-34 (1984) ("I would abolish [the
provocation defense] and convict all intentional killers of murder. Reasonable people do not
kill no matter how much they are provoked....").
In the rape context, the legislature could decide, for example, that raping women who
dress provocatively is somehow less deviant (more understandable) than raping women who
dress conservatively. Society could recognize that behavior as not being criminal. This is
different, however, from recognizing that such behavior is criminal, but justifying it because
the victim "brought it on herself."
Some scholars, however, say this is exactly what the law of provocation does. They
characterize it as a contributory negligence issue rather than a mens rea issue. See A. J.
Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 307 (1976):
Whereas the paradigmatic case of murder might be an attack on an innocent
victim, the paradigm of provocation generally involves moral wrongs by both
parties .... Ordinary language reflects this approach, with characteristic
phrases such as "he brought it on himself," "she asked for it" and "it served him
right". The complicity of the victim cannot and should not be ignored.
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injuries.172 Under contributory negligence principles, if, in fact, the
plaintiff caused the injuries, she cannot recover. In criminal law,
causation often is not an issue. Many crimes are defined without
reference to any result from the criminal conduct. They consist
merely of mens rea and actus reus (for example, attempt, conspir-
acy, burglary, assault).17 Rape is also a crime that does not refer-
ence a particular result (like specific injuries or death). Causation
arises in criminal law only in limited circumstances, for example,
where a defendant intended to kill a victim but an intervening
event killed the victim first (the victim had a heart attack and died
at the same time the defendant pulled the trigger to shoot). In most
criminal cases, however, whether the victim's behavior was a con-
tributing cause of the crime is wholly irrelevant. Certainly, no rape
could be complete if the rape victim did not have sex with the
perpetrator. Nonetheless, that contributing cause does not elimi-
nate a required element of rape.
Finally, judges presiding over tort cases have put themselves
in the business of fixing plaintiffs' economic incentives by prevent-
ing negligent plaintiffs from recovering. They hope to encourage
people to exercise reasonable care. Perhaps judges do this because
tort law is largely an economic affair. Most often, plaintiffs sue for
monetary damage awards. The court has the responsibility of
determining just compensation. This inevitably involves an
economic calculus of the kind of compensation the plaintiff de-
serves. Criminal courts are generally not involved in such determi-
nations.174 For example, a defendant who robs someone who chose
to walk alone at night in a high crime area is no less guilty than a
defendant who robs someone in a safe area in the middle of the day.
Encouraging the complainant to be cautious is not part of criminal
law jurisprudence.'75 For all of these reasons, the general legal
172. See Gyerman v. United States Lines Co., 498 P.2d 1043, 1053 (Cal. 1972) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465(1)) (MThe fundamental question, then, is whether the
plaintiff, as 'the negligent actor has so produced the harm to himself ... for which he is
sought to be held responsible.., as to make the law regard his conduct as the cause of the
harm .... ).
173. See CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra note 45, at 587.
174. There are, however, certain instances in which the criminal court will address
economic compensation. For example, in certain jurisdictions the criminal court can approve
an "accord and satisfaction," in which an assault defendant compensates the complainant in
exchange for a dismissal. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 55 (West 1997). In addition,
courts will sometimes require payments of restitution. See id. at § 87A. But such restitution
is usually payable to the court, not the complainant.
175. See R. A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punish-
ment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 79-80 (1996):
Consider the role of "contributory negligence" in civil as contrasted with
1997]
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consensus is that contributory negligence and assumption of risk
have no place in criminal law. 'The primary difference between
torts and criminal law is that the assumption of risk can be a
defense of varying impact in tort cases; whereas in criminal cases
of violent aggression, the victim's knowing and voluntary exposure
to the risk is no defense."'
7 6
Some scholars have argued, however, that the criminal law
should incorporate victim precipitation defenses. Professor Alon
Harel makes the case for comparative fault in criminal law based
on law and economics principles.' 7  He regards his project as
extending "Coasian insight from tort law to criminal law."'17 He
argues that careless victims impose negative externalities on
society by wasting state punishment resources on crime caused, at
least in part, by their own careless behavior. If the state does not
hold the victim responsible for his carelessness, the victim has no
incentive to take optimal precautions. 79  Harel asserts that
"[p]recautions taken by victims provide two types of positive
externalities. The first directly benefits other potential victims by
making crime less profitable; the second benefits the population at
large by reducing the indirect costs of crime, in particular, the costs
of the enforcement system."'8 ° Basically, Harel characterizes the
victim as the cheapest cost avoider. He further argues that
criminals will be more reluctant to commit crimes against cautious
citizens and more likely to target careless victims. This, in turn,
will provide a greater incentive for people to take care.'8 '
criminal law. In a civil case, the defendant's liability is reduced if he can show
that the plaintiff contributed to the harm she suffered by her own negligence.
Now crime victims may also have made it more likely that they would become
victims: householders who leave their houses insecure, car owners who fail to
lock their cars, women who dress or behave in certain ways. We might criticize
their behavior as imprudent, but do not think that it mitigates the liability of
the criminal who takes advantage of it. This illustrates the sense in which the
core of the criminal law should be a set of categorical prohibitions.
176. George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347, 358 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
177. Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law
Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181 passim (1994); see also Omri Ben-
Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions
Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434 (1995). For the purposes of this paper, I will
condense these complex economic theories into a few main arguments. I hope not to give too
short shrift to Professor Harel's theories.
178. Harel, supra note 176, at 1188.
179. See id. at 1194-95.
180. Id. at 1195-96 (footnotes omitted).
181. See id. at 1196-97.
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There are, however, some apparent flaws to Professor Harel's
theory. First, it seems to overstep the incentive-fixing role that
courts give themselves even in tort cases. In tort cases, if the
plaintiff is negligent, denying recovery is a way to encourage the
victim to be cautious. It prevents the negligent plaintiff from being
made "whole" by denying recovery or full recovery. This is not true
of criminal cases. The victim of a crime is not "compensated" by a
criminal conviction. The criminal is punished. In a robbery, for
example, most victims never get the stolen goods back. They
generally are not compensated for any pain and suffering by the
outcome of the criminal trial. Victims are compensated only if they
have insurance policies or prevail in concurrent civil trials. Thus,
crime victims already have plenty of incentive to protect themselves
- they need to avoid being victims of crime. Once someone has
been robbed, most likely he will invest in a security system. If he
does not, it is unlikely that mitigating the criminal's punishment
will be much of an incentive, especially considering that many theft
victims do not even appear at the criminal trial. It is also improba-
ble that a comparative fault rule would affect the incentives of
potential victims. If people do not have enough incentive to obtain
security systems to avoid being violated in their homes, it is
unlikely that mitigation of criminal punishment will provide much
more incentive. A more efficient way to encourage precaution is
through private contract law. When people contract with insurance
companies, the companies can make reasonable precaution a
prerequisite for recovery.
Moreover, a contributory negligence rule in criminal law may
create incentives for criminals to commit crimes against careless
people. Harel views this as a good thing, arguing that it will
transfer crime from the careful to the careless.182 I do not believe
this is the case. First, there is enough crime to go around. Smart
criminals still have incentives to rob wealthy people with alarm
systems. The deterrence effect of criminal penalties to the dumb
criminal who would likely get caught and punished, however, is all
but lost. Harel does not take into account the incentive effect such
a rule would have on people who, otherwise, would have been too
scared to rob at all. Also, with more crimes against careless people
without security systems (who are probably, on average, poorer),
criminals will get less compensation for each crime. This, in turn,
may increase the number of crimes thieves commit in order to steal
the same amount. Harel probably would argue that this would
182. See id.
19971
244 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:203
have a general deterrent effect on crime. With the punishment
being reduced, however, thieves have little reason not to "go for it."
In addition, Harel's joint-cost argument fails to take into
account Professor Steven Shavell's activity level argument.'83 That
is, characterizing criminals and victims as joint causers does not
recognize the fact that the criminal should not have been engaging
in the activity in the first place. The criminal "will not be motivated
to consider the effect on [victims] of his choice of whether to engage
in his activity."'84 Moreover, crime, like ultrahazardous activities
or product defects, imposes disproportionate costs on society. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts does not recognize contributory
negligence as a defense to ultrahazardous activity because of the
policy to give "full responsibility for preventing the harm resulting
from [ultrahazardous activities] upon the person who has subjected
others to the abnormal risk."'85 For this reason criminals' costs
should not be mitigated by victims' contributory negligence or
assumption of risk.'86
Professor Harel's view of criminal law has some disturbing
societal ramifications. First, it may place a premium on the elite's
ability to opt out of the average governmental protection. One could
draw an analogy to the debate over school vouchers. The govern-
ment provides a certain level of education to society, as it does
police protection. Those with security systems have opted out of the
minimal protection provided by the government. Contributory
negligence, like private school vouchers, rewards those who opt out
183. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 2-3 (1980).
Shavell makes the activity level argument in the context of negligence versus strict liability.
It is arguably even more applicable to contributory negligence:
By definition, under the negligence rule all that an injurer needs to do to avoid
the possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due care if he engages in
his activity Consequently he will not be motivated to consider the effect on
accident losses of his choice of whether to engage in his activity or, more
generally, of the level at which to engage in his activity; he will choose his level
of activity in accordance only with the personal benefits so derived.... Thus he
will be led to choose too high a level of activity; the negligence
rule is not "efficient."
However, under a rule of strict liability, the situation is different. Because an
injurer must pay for losses whenever he is involved in an accident, he will be
induced to consider the effect on accident losses of both his level of care and his
level of activity.
184. Id. at 2.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 cmt. a (1965).
186. See George P. Fletcher, Book Review, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1675 (1993) ("The
same principle [that criminal law does not recognize the contributory negligence defense]
informs the pockets of strict liability in which we dispense with both the fault requirement
and the relevance of the victim's contributory fault.').
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of the governmental scheme. Contributory negligence principles are
more problematic, however, because they do not just compensate
those who opt out of the basic governmental scheme. They actually
hurt those who simply rely on the government for their protection.
Such a regime would inevitably disparately impact those who
cannot afford security.
Moreover, this legal regime may negatively impact society in
general. Negligence is premised on the idea that there is a
minimum societal standard of care from which the negligent party
deviates. This societal standard lays out presumptively what
members of the society "ought" to do. It thus incorporates a view of
the optimal, cost-free society. Harel advocates a society in which
everyone is always obligated to lock their doors, have extensive
alarm systems, secure their cars, etc. Although in this day and age
it is certainly prudent to take certain precautions, the more we
incorporate those precautions into the criminal law, the smaller the
range of acceptable behaviors becomes. The ideal society becomes
less a society where you do not have to buy an alarm system or
always lock your doors and more a society where people are
prisoners in their own homes. The freedom of the victim is at the
heart of criminal law:
The criminal law shields victims against their own imprudence.
They are entitled to move in the world at large with as much
freedom as they enjoy behind locked doors. They can walk in
the park when they want, sit where they want in the subway,
and wear skimpy clothes without fearing that they will be
faulted for precipitating rape. This is what it means to be a free
person, and the criminal law protects this freedom by not
censuring those who expose themselves, perhaps with less than
due care, to risks of criminal aggression. The blame properly
attaches to the mugger, thief, and rapist, regardless of the
victim's role in the interaction leading to the crime.'87
Besides the general criticisms of victim precipitation defenses
in criminal law, there are criticisms specific to the context of rape.
Even Professor Harel does not advocate the extension of contribu-
tory negligence principles to rape:
Women are more vulnerable to some crimes than men, since
they are more likely to become victims of sexual offenses.
Minorities are more vulnerable to racially based crimes than
187. Fletcher, supra note 176, at 356.
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whites. The equal protection model should govern the distribu-
tion of protection to women and minorities because their
vulnerability is involuntary.8 '
While this argument does not seem to address the specific volun-
tary victim behavior targeted by contributory negligence defenses
as opposed to the general assumption of risk of rape by women, I" 9
it merits further discussion. Critics note that the specific problem
of precipitation defenses in rape is that rape statutes are meant to
protect the very vulnerability that such defenses make a liability.
This criticism also has arisen in the context of domestic abuse 9 °
and sexual harassment.'"' When women choose to exercise their
(legitimate) freedom to drink, dress sexy, go to nightclubs or
fraternity parties, or go on casual dates, they place themselves in
particular positions of danger by virtue of their legitimate
behavior.'92 When jurors utilize contributory negligence principles,
"[p]rotection is removed where it is most needed, in the cases of
women who exercise some of the freedom that rape laws ought to
provide for them.'' s
Some would characterize a rape victim's contributory behavior
as evidence of the victim's propensity to take risks or defy stereo-
188. Harel, supra note 177, at 1204.
189. This will be addressed below. See infra text accompanying notes 208-12.
190. See James T. R. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions Against the
Unresponsive Police, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 42-43 (1991) (footnotes omitted):
[A]llowing a contributory negligence defense in cases where law enforcement
officers disregard their obligation to protect victims of spouse abuse would be
abhorrent. Obviously believing that victims of spouse abuse are unable to
defend themselves, legislators pass special laws to mandate that the police
protect them. Allowing the authorities to raise negligence defenses in such
cases would run counter to the very rationale underlying protection decree
laws.
191. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Number N-915-050(C)(3) (1990):
In general, a woman does not forfeit her right to work in an atmosphere free
from sexual harassment by choosing to work in an atmosphere that has
traditionally included vulgar, anti-female language .... [A] woman does not
assume the risk of harassment by voluntarily entering an abusive, anti-female
environment.
192. See SUE BESSMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE 280 (1976):
The notion of contributory negligence seriously undercuts both of the
potentially protective influences of law. Should a woman choose to exercise her
freedom of movement and go into a place where she might be in danger, she
particularly needs the protection of the law. Yet the notion of contributory
negligence suggests that her act of free will should be interpreted as a
willingness to receive the advances of any man. Thus, should she be raped, the
courts are likely to argue that she actually consented, as evidenced by the fact
that she placed herself in the position of needing legal protection.
193. Id.
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types rather than evidence of vulnerability. 19 4 Some suggest that
part of the appeal of contributory behavior to women is the risk of
sexual domination,'95 while others say such a suggestion danger-
ously misconstrues women's actual psychology.'96 Although many
feel that risky sexual behavior on the part of victims ought to
subject them to a certain amount of liability (imposed through
decreasing sanctions against their abusers),'97 the criminal law
generally does not sanction risky behavior. Even if it is true that
precipitation behavior is risky, the law does not recognize risky
behavior as absolving the state of its responsibility to protect the
risk-taker. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
first amendment to protect those whose speech may be highly
inflammatory to hostile audiences. 9 s The court recognized the
law's specific obligation to those whose exercise of free speech is
194. See Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of
Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1384 (1992). Kennedy says, in making the
observation in the context of sexy dressing,:
The woman whose dress defies patriarchy conveys the comforting messaige that
women are more like men in their sexuality than either patriarchy or feminism
have much acknowledged. No woman will be true in the way the culture
promises that the madonna type will be true. But neither are women the aliens
they would be if they could be like that.
Id.
195. See id. at 1390:
Abuse, tangled into the cultural images through which we produce and
interpret our own and other people's sexuality, seems to me to weigh heavily on
this tricky, risky enterprise [of sexy dressing].... [O]ur culture inculcates
erotic pleasure in male domination of women in every aspect of life.
See also id. at 1392 (observing the woman's "experience of overwhelming, ego-obliterating
pleasure when she surrenders to the will of the male abuser").
196. See Torrey, supra note 36 (observing that it is a myth that "women derive pleasure
from victimization"); See BESSMER, supra note 191, at 285 (citation omitted):
[I]t might be argued by those who accept the view that negligent women really
want to have intercourse with anyone who comes down the pike that the women
didn't really refuse. Again Amir's data directly contradict this imputation. He
discovers that there is greater resistance among victims in victim precipitated
rapes than in non-victim precipitated cases ....
197. See, e.g., Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 67 (1952) (footnotes omitted) ("[A]
woman's need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the unconscious desire for forcible
penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the guilt feelings which might arise after
willing participation.").
198. Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), reprinted in CONSITUTIONAL LAW: CASES -
COMMENTS - QUESTIONS 725 (Lockhart et al. eds., 8th ed. 1996):
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction... with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. [That] is why freedom of speech, though not absolute .... is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of serious substantive evil ....
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particularly risky.'99 Thus, so long as the underlying behavior of
the victim is legitimate, the law protects the victim from the
negative social outcomes of that behavior.
Some contend, however, that the underlying behavior is, in
fact, not legitimate. People articulate vocally, or believe subcon-
sciously, that women should not have the right to go to certain
places, dress certain ways, or engage in certain kinds of relation-
ships. 00 There are, however, both procedural and substantive
problems with incorporating such thinking into the law of rape. On
the procedural level, if people believe that women should not have
the same rights as men, then they should exercise their democratic
rights, vote, and have the legislature pass laws codifying these
sexist beliefs. Law enforcement officers, judges, and juries should
not be permitted to voice their patriarchal beliefs by importing into
the rape trial defenses not recognized by the law. Those who have
such beliefs probably are aware, however, that if they did try to use
their legitimate democratic powers to affect their sexists beliefs, the
Constitution would thwart their efforts. For the most part, equal
protection does not allow the law to prevent women from going
where they please and dressing how they please.2 ' Knowing this,
those who support patriarchy use other means to discourage women
from using the freedom the law recognizes.' °2 For example, the law
199. See Harel, supra note 177, at 1205:
Sometimes the legal system grants special protection to vulnerable victims
despite the voluntary nature of the victim's vulnerability. Victims are protected
if their vulnerability is attributed to a voluntary act which possesses an
important social value. We insist on granting full protection to individuals who
use their First Amendment rights in a way which provokes a hostile reaction,
even if by doing so they voluntarily expose themselves to severe risks.
200. See BESSMER, supra note 192, at 280-81:
The problem ultimately lies in the fact that most judges do not believe that
women ought to have the right to go about with the same freedom as males.
For some this position is actually prohibitive. Those who take a prohibitive
view do not argue that women who violate these norms ought to be raped. At
the same time, they do nothing to further the notion that part of what is wrong
with rape is that it limits the ability of women to move freely and that a
woman's taking freedom of movement as a right does not presuppose sexual
promiscuity.
201. See e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (mandating that women
gain admission to the traditionally all male Virginia Military Institute).
202. Duncan Kennedy argues that sexual abuse, itself, is such a means:
[The pathological abuser is a kind of vigilante. The woman victim has violated
a customary rule about how women are supposed to behave. Most people would
agree that rape or murder triggered by the woman's misconduct is a totally
inappropriate response. But we also agree that fear of some kind of abusive
reaction has in fact a strong deterrent effect on women contemplating violation
of a whole range of patriarchal norms.
Kennedy, supra note 194, at 1329. See also Taslitz, supra note 2.
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dictated that women be admitted to the Citadel, a traditionally all-
male military college.2 °" Once admitted, however, the opponents of
the law affected women's exclusion by other means. The school
allowed male students to abuse the female cadets, exclude them
from social activities, and even set them on fire.2 "4 The result was
that the women dropped out.0 5 In the end, the women were not
allowed to enjoy the very freedom the law had explicitly granted to
them. The same may be said of workplace harassment. It is the
nonlegal response to antidiscrimination law's mandate that women
gain access to the types of jobs traditionally denied to them.0 6
On the substantive level, it is just wrong to say that women
should not be able to engage in the full range of activities in which
men engage. Most simply, it is sexist to hold that women do not
have the right to drink, go to bars, or have one night stands.
Advocates of precipitation defenses contend that such behavior
hurts society by precipitating crime. Many studies, however, report
that rapists are predisposed to sexual assault, despite the behavior
of the victim.20 7 Moreover, it is impossible to isolate the particular
acts causing rape so as to eradicate them. Even if the law explicitly
forbade women to engage in contributory behavior, women would
have no clue how to act. The married woman assumes the risk of
rape because she is married. The single woman assumes the risk
of rape because she is single and on a date. The loose woman
assumes the risk of rape because she is loose. The virgin is
assumed to be fabricating rape charges to protect her virginity.
203. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994).
204. See Sybil Fix, Fourth-Class System Under Fire: Citadel Barracks: James Jones,
President of the Citadel's Board of Visitors Said He Has Asked Citadel's Interim President
to Assign Adults to the Barracks, but Not As Guards, CHARLESTON POST & COURIER, Dec. 21,
1996, at B1 ("Female cadets Jeanie Mentavlos of Charlotte and Kim Messer of Clover say
they were shoved, threatened, set afire.. .. ").
205. See The Citadel Dismisses Cadet for Hazing Treatment Led to Two Women Quitting
School, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 1997, at 6A.
206. See Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11
LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 15-16 (1992) (footnote omitted) ("[D]omestic violence qua control can be
seen as part of the enforcement of gender dominance at home, just as rape serves that
function on the streets and sexual harassment serves it in the workplace.").
207. See Daphne Edwards, Comment, Acquaintance Rape & the "Force"Element: When
"No"Is Not Enough, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 241, 268 n.133 (1996) ("Eighty-two percent
of sexual assaults are planned or partly planned by the assailant before the rape occurs.");
DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 189 (1975) (citing
THE FEDERAL COMMISSION ON CRIMES OF VIOLENCE REPORT) (noting that studies show that
only "[four percent] of reported rapes involved any precipitate behavior on the part of the
victim"); Tim Warren, Alice Vachs: Public (and Published) Vengeance, BALTIMORE SUN, July
19, 1993, at 1D (citation omitted) ('There are many motivations for rape and in some cases
it's a question of whether the rapists are predisposed because of some preexisting psychiatric
condition that could be treated.").
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Arguably, assumption of risk of rape, in its most basic form,
attaches not to any external behavior but to womanhood.2 °8
But what if there are certain behaviors which have at least a
demonstrable correlative, if not causal, relationship with rape?20 9
Should those behaviors be discouraged as a matter of public policy?
The answer is no. In addition to the argument that preventing
women from exercising the full array of freedoms men enjoy denies
equal protection and codifies existing sexist views, there are other
reasons why victim precipitate behavior should not be discouraged.
First, punishing such behavior transfers negative external costs
from the perpetrator to the victim. In the domestic abuse context:
[t]his leads to the simple law and economics hypothesis that
increasing protection from sexual abuse should increase the
bargaining power of women vis-A-vis men . . . . Reducing
protection, on the other hand, should make women more
dependent on men who don't abuse, by making leaving riskier,
and thereby make them more willing to make concessions.210
In the rape context, women must internalize the costs of preventing
rape. They must bear the expenses of self-protection. They must
restrict what they do and when they do it. Moreover, in the same
way that comparative negligence principles unnecessarily provide
too much incentive to prevent theft, contributory negligence in rape
provides too much incentive to stop contributory behavior.21' The
extra "incentive" is, in fact, merely punitive. It serves no purpose
other than to give effect to society's disdain for women who engage
in contributory behavior.
In addition, contributory behavior may possess social value as
more than a mere expression of freedom. Not only should women
be "free" to engage in behavior not everyone approves of, that
behavior itself may serve social purposes. This is demonstrated in
much of the arguments of opponents of rape reform. These
opponents make both victim precipitation arguments and social
208. See Harel, supra note 177, at 1204 (advocating protecting women because they are
"victims who are particularly vulnerable to crime due to factors that are beyond their
control").
209. See Kennedy, supra note 194, at 1330 (observing the correlation between sexy dress
and abuse as well as the resultant response of women to regulate their behavior).
210. Id. at 1328.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 188-197. In other words, the rape victim has
plenty of incentive to prevent rape. It is unlikely that adding contributory negligence would
effect that incentive, especially because women already know that rape is a crime for which
they can expect little to no vindication.
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preservation arguments. In terms of the former, opponents posit
that rape shield reforms unfairly exclude inquiry into the victims'
behavior and character. In terms of the latter, opponents criticize
affirmative consent standards because they ruin preexisting modes
of sexual communication between men and women - they prevent
the "sexy silence" that occurs before intercourse.212 The interesting
thing is the juxtaposition of these two arguments. Although,
opponents of rape reform want to preserve sexual mystique, they
create liability for that mystique through victim precipitation
defenses, which does the exact opposite. Thus, contributory negli-
gence defenses undermine the very sexual behavior that their pro-
ponents wish to preserve. Making women assume the risk of rape
aims at discouraging them from remaining silent, dressing sexy, or
going to bars, by decriminalizing the resultant sexual abuse. There
is, however, an "argument for a male erotic interest in reducing the
sexual abuse of women":
Abuse screws women up sexually, and that's bad for men. It
discourages women from risking, disciplines them not to risk
the forms of pleasure/resistance through which we might
eroticize autonomy .... And it burdens both men's and women's
fantasy, play, experiment and innovation with questions, risks,
fears, and guilt that trap us in the reproduction of patriarchal
sex. Being against abuse is not, for men, just a matter of
human rights, empathy, protecting "our" women, romantic
paternalism or political correctness, however valid and impor-
tant each of those may be.21
Thus the criminal law should not permit the informal imposition of
liability on victims, not just because women should have the
freedom to do as they please, but also because the underlying acts
themselves are not the kind that should be condemned by society.214
212. See Remick, supra note 3, at 1148 (quoting Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist
Analysis, 8 LAw & PHIL. 217, 229 (1989):
One possible objection to the idea of a mandatory verbal inquiry is that it
threatens to destroy the intimacy of sexual relations - that seeking and
acquiring verbal consent would "ruin the moment." This objection assumes a
sort of "silent is sexy" view of intimate physical relations, "a conception of
sexual pleasure that springs from wordless interchanges, and of sexual success
that occurs in a place of meaningful silence."
213. Kennedy, supra note 194, at 1393.
214. This is an important distinction from the defense of provocation. I argued above, see
supra note 171, that provocation is not really a precipitation defense so much as a lack of
mens rea defense. Even if it were a precipitation defense, however, it is distinguishable from
rape precipitation defenses because the provoking act is socially undesirable. Provocation,
like self defense, usually involves the victim acting in a violent, provocative manner. See
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF TORT DEFENSES IN
RAPE LAW
Thus far, this paper has been deconstructive. 15 It has merely
described the problem of tort defenses in rape law and examined
the failure of current rape shield legislation to address this
problem. This portion of the paper hopes to be part of a reconstruc-
tive dialogue on rape law. It proposes some initial steps toward the
elimination of tort-type defenses from the law of rape. It does not,
however, propose a plan to eliminate patriarchal thinking in society
for that is a socio-psychological undertaking beyond the scope of
this paper.216 The proposals for eliminating tort defenses will be
internal to the law of rape and the rape trial process. Neither will
this paper propose categorical exclusions of evidence relating to
victim precipitation. One of the biggest problems with rape shield
reform, as highlighted in the earlier discussion, is overbreadth. 17
Rape shield laws' per se exclusions of categories of evidence have a
tendency to infringe upon fair trial guarantees. 218 Moreover, it is
simply implausible to exclude all such evidence. Victim precipita-
tion evidence encompasses such a wide range of background
behavior 2 9 that it would be impossible for the jury to get a coherent
picture of the events at issue without admitting some precipitation
evidence.
State v. Guebara, 696 P.2d 381 (1985) (stating that words alone can never constitute
sufficient provocation). With provocation, the victims' underlying acts are so bad that they
make murder understandable. In rape precipitation cases, the underlying behaviors are bad
only if one adopts a patriarchal view of the "proper" role of women.
I have also heard the argument that the battered women syndrome defense is essentially
a victim precipitation defense. It invites the jury to judge the dead batterer instead of the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. See generally Keith Lieberthal, Conflicting Laws,
Conflicted Sentiments (Feb. 1, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor Parker,
Harvard Law School). Even if this is true, battered women's syndrome defense is
distinguishable from rape precipitation defenses in the same way as provocation: The
underlying victim behavior (battering) is socially reprehensible. Although making risk of
death an additional punishment for battering has the procedural problems discussed earlier,
see supra p. 241, it does not have as many substantive problems as victim precipitation
defenses in rape for the simple reason that the underlying act of battering is socially
undesirable.
215. See Barbara Stark, International Human Rights Law, Feminist Jurisprudence, and
Nietzsche's "Eternal Return" Turning the Wheel, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 169, 169 n.1
("[D]econstruction may be understood as a form of critical analysis with which to expose and
question the underlying premises of a particular assumption.").
216. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 160.
218. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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The first way to combat the importation of tort defenses into
the rape trial is to eliminate all forms of tort defenses from
statutory law. It is time for Penal Codes finally to eliminate all
vestiges of the marital exemption.22 ° The logic behind the marital
exemption in its current form might be understandable in cases
where the defendants' reasonable belief as to consent is an issue.
The fact of marriage may explain why the defendant had a reason-
able belief that the complainant consented to sex. The defendant's
reasonable belief, however, is not always at issue. Many statutes
define rape irrespective of the defendant's objective or even
subjective belief, opting for a definition involving force or the
victim's subjective belief as to consent.221 The marital status of the
victim is completely irrelevant to the issue of whether or not there
was force. Although the fact of marriage may be germane to the
issue of whether or not the victim actually consented, the law still
should not employ a marital exemption. The marital exemption
prevents the jury from deciding the significance of marriage to
consent and, instead, mandates that a married woman does not
have the capacity to not consent to sex with her husband. Relevant
evidence of marital status should come in through the trial process.
The weight of marital status should not be designated by statute.
Once made part of the trial process, however, there is still the
problem that juries will employ the same type of reasoning used by
the legislature in creating the exemption. This problem is ad-
dressed below. For the same reasons, judges and legislatures
should eliminate the voluntary social companion exception 222 and all
remnants of the resistance requirement 223 from statutory and case
law.
Judges must also eliminate tort-type defenses from the common
law.224 They must guard against incorporating the "she asked for
it" type of analysis into their opinions. They cannot subtly premise
liability on the contributory behavior of the victim. The problem is
how to police judges and prevent them from purposefully, or even
subconsciously, incorporating such defenses into their rulings. One
way may be to add the admonition against tort defenses to rape
statutes. Legislatures could amend rape statutes to explicate that
220. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing the marital exemption).
221. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 463(a)(1)(1957) (defining rape as "force or threat
of force against the will and without the consent of the other person).
222. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntary social companion
exception).
223. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the resistance requirement).
224. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing tort-type defenses in
common law).
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contributory behavior of the victim is not a defense.225 This kind of
amendment would help prevent precipitation defenses from slipping
into the trial in the first place.226 It would also give prosecutors
grounds to object to evidence that has no probative value outside its
tendency to support a victim precipitation defense.
In addition to eliminating tort defenses from the statutory and
common law, police and prosecutors must eliminate this type of
thinking from their decisions to investigate and prosecute.227 Only
a minority of rape cases ever reach the trial stage.228 Thus, some of
the most damaging uses of victim precipitation defenses occurs at
the pre-trial stage. Determining how to convince police and
prosecutors to abandon this kind of thinking is difficult. One
reason that police and prosecutors judge victims for their contribu-
tory behavior is that they rely on the same social myths on which
the jury relies when it acquits defendants based on victim precipita-
tion.22 9 There are, however, also legitimate reasons why police and
prosecutors do not pursue cases in which there is evidence of victim
precipitation: They do not want to waste valuable time and effort
on cases that will never result in conviction. Thus, the battle to
encourage police and prosecutors to abandon tort defenses must be
waged on two fronts. First, police departments and prosecutors'
offices must incorporate education against rape myths into their
training programs. Just as police and prosecutors are trained to
investigate rapes thoroughly, they should also be trained to
abandon the stereotypical thinking which keeps them from
adequately investigating and prosecuting rapes. 'The few available
studies suggest that police and prosecutors are more conservative
than community members in attitudes about rape, but that
attitudes among police who have been exposed to educational
programs do change . ,,230 Second, prosecutors must be able to
secure more convictions. If prosecutors begin to win trials in which
225. Judges generally give effect to the intent of legislative reforms. See BOURQUE, supra
note 34, at 128 (citing Galvin, supra note 7); see also Jane Strickland, The 1992 Court Reform
Act: Its Role in the Development of the Massachusetts Juvenile Court, 39 Apr. B. B.J. 9, 12
(1995) (commenting that legislative reform greatly affected the administration of justice
within the courtroom).
226. See Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 194
(1994) (The [criminal] code's liability rules serve as the judge's touchstone for determining
what facts are legally relevant. In this way, the code determines what evidence the jury will
see and hear.').
227. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing police and prosecutor
employment of victim precipitation defenses).
228. See BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 100.
229. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing rape myths).
230. BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 129.
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there is evidence of victim precipitation, they will be more likely to
prosecute. In turn, the police will be more likely to investigate.
The problem is how to ensure there will be more convictions in
cases involving victim precipitation. It is not appropriate to tinker
with the trial process just to increase conviction rates. Such
tinkering would be like mandating that every fourth rape trial
result in conviction.23' Reforms to the trial process that create a
greater likelihood of conviction are justified only when they remedy
legal errors within the trial. While it is true that acquitting a
rapist based on the contributory negligence of the victim is im-
proper, not all acquittals happen solely because of contributory
behavior. There are cases in which the jury acquits based on
contributory negligence, but they could have acquitted based on
consent. The trick, therefore, is to find a way to preserve the jury's
ability to acquit based on consent while removing the improper
influence of tort defenses. Again, judges must take an active role
in policing the admissibility of victim precipitation evidence.232
Precipitation evidence often comes in to the trial as mere back-
ground evidence.233 Judges must remember that the importation of
tort defenses into the law of rape is illegal, and statutory law's
explicit rejection of tort defenses may remind judges of this fact.234
Once judges realize that acquittals based upon contributory
negligence are illegal, they can incorporate this realization into
their evidence rulings. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and similar state laws mandate that "evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice .... "235 Judges should implement the prohibition
against tort defenses through their Rule 403 rulings. The particu-
lar danger of prejudice, presented by precipitation evidence, is the
danger that juries will ignore the law of rape and acquit because the
victim "deserved it." Rule 403 should prevent exactly this type of
prejudice.2 31 Judges must weigh the probative value of any single
piece of evidence against the likelihood that such evidence will lead
the jury to acquit based on the contributory behavior of the victim.
This will cause mere background evidence or cumulative evidence
231. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
232. See BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 128 ('[J]udges in particular retain enormous power
in the courtroom and if so disposed can selectively apply criminal sanctions....").
233. For example, where the couple met, whether they were drinking, what she was
wearing, whether they were on a date, where they went, etc.
234. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
235. FED. R. EVID. 403.
236. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
1997] 255
256 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:203
to face a high hurdle before admittance, 37 given the propensity of
juries to acquit on contributory negligence grounds. Judges, there-
fore, must receive information about juror's propensity to acquit on
such grounds. Again, legislative action may be the answer. The
legislature could include in rape statutes observations of the high
incidences of tort defense bootlegging. 38 Judges would then be
more aware that this form of "prejudice" is very pervasive and that
the risk of undue prejudice from victim precipitation is always high.
Exclusion of such evidence on the grounds of prejudice should
profoundly decrease the chances the jury will employ tort defenses.
"Available data indicate that jurors are clearly influenced by the
amount and type of legally irrelevant information presented to
them. 2 39
If the judge decides to admit the precipitation evidence, then
she should provide a limiting instruction to the jury.240 The judge
must admonish the jury that the evidence is admissible for the lim-
ited purpose of the relevant inquiry and is not admissible to show
that the victim "asked for it." The judge should also keep a careful
eye on defense attorneys and prevent them from pursuing lines of
questioning that have no other function than to expose the contribu-
tory behavior of the victim. 14 1 Judges must prevent attorneys from
237. See Park, supra note 151, at 771:
Considerations of nullification prejudice and waste of time usually have a
combined effect. For example, when a defendant wishes to produce evidence
showing a war to be unjust in the course of defending against a charge arising
from a protest against that war, the two considerations point in the same
direction.
238. For example, the preamble or explanatory notes might state, "Juries have been
acquitting criminal defendant's of rape based on victim precipitation rather than the law."
Rape shield statutes contain such statements. See e.g., .FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory
committee's notes ("The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public
disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding
process.").
239. Bourque, supra note 34, at 128. See also Robinson, supra note 226, at 195 ("Evidence
screening at trial may well be the single most effective means by which the code's liability
rules have influence.").
240. Again, this should only be in cases where a limiting instruction can be effective in
removing the particular danger of prejudice. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's
notes ("In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice,
consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a
limiting instruction.').
241. See John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43
SYRACUSE L. REv. 695, 695 (1992) ('Sometimes the conduct of the parties or of their counsel
in the course of litigation itself creates evidence relevant to a disputed issue in the case. The
question is then presented whether this evidence should be available for use by the trier of
fact or be excluded because its use may deter parties from engaging in activity that promotes
some important objective of the litigation process.').
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arguing victim precipitation in their closing statements just as they
would prevent attorneys from arguing in favor of jury nullifica-
tion.242 Arguments urging the jury to take into account the
contributory behavior of the accuser are essentially arguments for
jury nullification.243
Courts have already ruled that contributory negligence does not
formally bar prosecution for rape."' Indeed, rape reformers have
called for the elimination of precipitation defenses in evidence rules
and jury instructions, observing that "[e]vidence rules and instruc-
tions which encourage the jury to indulge its notions of victim
precipitation fail to protect a woman's freedom of sexual choice. 245
To combat the pervasive bootlegging of tort defenses adequately,
judges must go even further and instruct the jury not to acquit
based upon the contributory behavior of the victim. The instruction
in a consent jurisdiction might read as follows:
The fact that the complaining witness may have acted in a way
that made her vulnerable to this crime should not affect your
verdict. If you have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the complaining
witness and that the complaining witness did not consent to the
intercourse, you must convict the defendant. Any belief that
the complaining witness asked for it, dressed inappropriately,
behaved inappropriately, or otherwise contributed to the
commission of the crime is not part of your decision as to the
defendant's guilt or innocence. You must follow the law rather
than your own belief about whether or not the complaining
witness asked for it. If you enter a verdict of not guilty based on
your beliefs about the victim's contributing behavior, you have
not followed the law.
One may have a problem with this instruction on civil libertarian
grounds because it invites the jury to convict. This same criticism
arises, however, whenever judges instruct juries not to nullify. The
242. See BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 129 (citing E. Borgida & P. White, Social Perception
of Rape Victims: The Impact of Legal Reform, 2 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 339 (1978); E.
Borgida, Legal Reform of Rape Laws, 1981 APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. ANN. 211; and G.D.
LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault
Tria/s, 32 SOC. PROB. 389 (1985) ("Attorneys are clever manipulators of truth. It is not just
the existence of evidence that influences a jury; often it is what the prosecuting attorney,
defense attorney, and judge make of the evidence that makes it important to a juror.")).
243. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
245. Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 613, 625-26 (1976).
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above instruction essentially instructs the jury to follow the law
rather than their own ideas of justice. Such an instruction is proper
and constitutional:
Jury nullification, like revolution, is a process about which
Americans have profoundly mixed feelings. It is safeguarded to
some extent, for example, by rules against directed verdicts in
criminal cases. Yet it is clear that the legal system could not
function for long if nullification became common. So judges do
not instruct juries about the right to nullify, or allow it to be
argued too blatantly, and the rules permit exclusion of evidence
that would encourage nullification.246
Defense attorneys ask for instructions against nullification all the
time. They ask judges to tell juries to presume the defendant
innocent and convict only when they find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, even if the jury feels that less probability of guilt warrants
conviction.
2 47
At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that jury
instructions will be ineffective. This is the rape shield-type
argument that only a per se exclusion of contributory evidence will
suffice. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the assump-
tion that jury instructions work as an integral part of the American
trial process. Justice Rehnquist stated in Parker v. Randolph:
A crucial assumption underlying [the jury] system is that juries
will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were
this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a
246. Park, supra note 151, at 771 (footnote omitted).
247. A jury instruction on presumption of innocence might read as follows:
The indictment or formal charge against a defendant is not evidence of guilt.
Indeed, the defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not
require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all [and
no inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a defendant not to
testify]. The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.
While the government's burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not
necessary that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It is
only required that the government's proof exclude "any reasonable doubt"
concerning the defendant's guilt.
A "reasonable doubt" is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you
would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most
important of your own affairs.
FIF 'H CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 1.05 (District Judges Association ed.,
1997).
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jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse
a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly in-
structed. 48
Not all experts agree, however, that this assumption is justified.
One study asked jurors to paraphrase instructions they had just
heard from the judge. Jurors could restate only thirteen percent of
the legally significant elements accurately.249 Another study
revealed that instructed jurors had at most a six percent greater
chance at understanding the law than uninstructed jurors.250
Another test showed only one out of eighteen jurors even remem-
bered the judge's curative instruction. 5 '
Other experts have observed that jury instructions are not
always ineffective. Experts draw a distinction between complex
instructions on burdens and standards and simple instructions on
disregarding evidence. Juries generally do not understand the first
type of instruction, but they can follow the second type:
Jurors are often asked to use information given them for only a
particular purpose .... Although some commentators have
criticized the effectiveness of jury instructions and the degree to
which juries understand and follow them, these criticisms focus
primarily on the more complex instructions, such as instruc-
tions as to burden or standard of proof.... [I] nstructions to
disregard certain types of testimony [are more easily under-
stood]. Studies have shown that such instructions are generally
followed. 52
The instruction against victim precipitation defenses is simple. It
does not involve complicated presumptions and burdens. The
instruction simply tells the jury to disregard certain evidence for its
248. 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979); see also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985)
("'[W]e adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury
that jurors carefully follow instructions.").
249. Robinson, supra note 226, at 170 (citing Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 91 n.101
(1988)).
250. Id. at 171 (citing Lawrence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions
That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 205-06 (1984)).
251. See Robert R. Calo, Joint 7rias, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of a Bare
Limiting Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21, 36 (1985) (citing Harold M. Hoffman &
Joseph Bradley, Jurors on Trial, 17 MO. L. REV. 235, 245 (1952)).
252. Joseph P. Liu, Federal Jury Instructions and the Consequences of a Successful
Insanity Defense, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1223, 1247 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
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tendency to show contributory negligence. ' 53 For this reason, jury
instructions may be more effective at reforming the rape trial than
tinkering with the definition of rape. Affirmative consent
standards25 4 require jurors to understand complex burden shifting,
differing proof standards, and presumptions. Chances are jurors
will not understand such laws, especially considering they run
counter to the instincts of many jurors about what rape law should
be.255 Jury instructions against tort defenses simply instruct juries
that "she asked for it" is not a defense to rape.
Another possible explanation for the apparent ineffectiveness
of jury instructions as to substantive law is that jurors nullify. 56
As Kalven and Zeisel discovered, however, juries generally want to
follow the law. They are aware of their obligations to follow the law
over their own beliefs.25 One study revealed that eighty-seven
percent of jurors discuss instructions with other jurors, and fifty-
seven percent to sixty-five percent read them aloud.25 Perhaps this
is why jurors feel compelled to fit their revolts against the law
within the parameters of the fact-finding. For example, the jury
will say that sexy clothes were evidence of consent when what they
really mean is that the woman assumed the risk.259 The instruction
against victim precipitation defenses directly combats the jury's
desire to deviate from the law. Such an explicit instruction against
nullification may be quite effective. "[S]tudies have shown that
juries are more willing to nullify when judges tell them that they
253. It is quite analogous to Liu's example of a "simple" instruction telling the jury to
disregard the illegal inferences from character evidence admitted to prove motive. Liu
states:
[E]vidence that reflects badly on a defendant's character is generally
inadmissible, since it may unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant.
Yet this same evidence is often admissible if used for another purpose, for
example, to prove motive. Jurors are told (and trusted to) keep such evidence
analytically separate.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
254. See supra note 14.
255. See Robinson, supra note 226, at 171 (footnotes omitted) ('The issues on which the
instructed jurors did better than uninstructed jurors... included the simpler issues and,
interestingly, issues on which the uninstructed jurors also did relatively well. This is
presumably because the legal instructions matched the uninstructed jurors' prior notions of
what the law was or should be.").
256. Id. at 173-76.
257. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
258. Robinson, supra note 226, at 173 (citing Steele & Thornburg, supra note 249, at 98).
1259. See supra text accompanying note 161; Robinson, supra note 226, at 173 ("While
giving formal deference, a juror may allow extraneous facts to affect his or her judgment or
may 'fudge' the application of a legal standard to reach a result more consistent with the
juror's sense of a fair and just result.').
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have such power and permit them to use it." 2" This implies that an
express instruction not to nullify will make juries less likely to
engage in nullification.
In addition, implementing jury instructions is the most
plausible way to combat tort defenses in the rape trial. A per se
exclusion of evidence of contributory behavior would have the same
problems of scope as that of rape shield laws. Given the scope of
contributory behavior, such an exclusion would be nearly impossible
to implement and highly unfair. Moreover, even if instructions are
not extremely effective, they set the background for a trial. They
send the message that the rape trial is not about the contributory
behavior of the complainant. Juries are bound to be affected by this
message:
It seems likely that jurors respond as much to the perceptions
of the players directing the case as to the information provided.
The process of voir dire, dismissal of juries for in camera
hearings, the judge's instructions and interactions with the
attorneys, and jurors' perceptions of the judge and attorneys
can all influence a jury's later deliberations and the subsequent
verdict.261
Even if jurors do not follow all instructions, without instructions
they have no idea that it is improper to bootleg tort defenses into
the rape trial. In the absence of an instruction against bootlegging
tort defenses into the rape trial, jurors actually think they are
following the law when they do so.262 Such an instruction at least
informs, if not compels, jurors to follow the law rather than their
own beliefs.
Others object to such an instruction on the grounds that it will
have the opposite of its intended effect. One study concluded that
jury instructions, "instead of forcing the jury to disregard the
evidence, sensitize[] the jury to the evidence." 6 ' One critic com-
pared the instruction against tort defenses to an instruction stating,
"you will not think about a pink elephant. 26 4 She contended that
260. Robinson, supra note 226, at 175 (citing Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury
Nullification Instructions on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 25, 34 (1985)).
261. BOURQUE, supra note 34, at 129.
262. See supra text accompanying note 71.
263. Calo, supra note 251, at 36 (citing Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury
Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959)).
264. Discussion with Jamie Gardner, Harvard Criminal Justice Institute clinical
instructor and former public defender, at Harvard Law School (Mar. 20, 1997).
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the instruction would draw jurors' attention to the victim precipita-
tion defense way of thinking rather than preventing them from
thinking in such a way. The problem with this criticism is that it
is inapposite. The instruction, "you will not think about a pink
elephant," is counterproductive because before the instruction is
given, no pink elephants have tromped through the courtroom.
Thus, the instruction itself plants the seed of that thought. In the
case of victim precipitation, research reveals that the elephant is
present from the moment jurors walk into the trial. Jurors already
are predisposed to think that way because of the influence of
patriarchy and social rape myths.265 A jury instruction would tell
the jury how to deal with that pink elephant. A jury instruction
would admonish jurors that precipitation evidence, although
possibly probative of consent, is not grounds for acquittal. An
instruction would advise jurors to follow the law of rape rather than
their predispositions as to the "proper" role of women. In the end,
it would tame the pink elephant.
VI. CONCLUSION
I will be a criminal defense attorney one day. I have no doubt
that I will represent rapists. In representing them I will present as
much evidence of their innocence as I can. Undoubtedly, some of
this evidence will involve the contributory behavior of the victim.
I may have to elicit testimony that the two met at a nightclub. I
may have to prove that she was drinking. I may even have to
present evidence of her clothing to the jury. When I present such
evidence and zealously advocate on behalf of my client, I hope to do
so without antecedent pangs of guilt. I hope to advocate the release
of an accused rapist in a forum that is procedurally correct and free
of invidious stereotype and myth. Yes, I will argue that my client
did not commit the crime. But when the jury goes back to their
room and deliberates, I want them to synthesize the evidence and
come to a legal and just conclusion. I do not want the jury to acquit
my client because they think the complainant "deserves what she
got." I want them to acquit him because he is innocent or because
the state has failed to prove that he is not. Hopefully, there will
come a day when the legal framework of the rape trial relieves my
conscience and ensures that verdicts reflect the law and not social
myths.
265. See supra note 38.
